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  Equal rights for men and women are among the basic norms of modern societies. The 
actual implementation of equal rights is traditionally a central project of progressive 
political forces.
  Against the background of the demographic change that can be observed in many 
industrialised countries family and gender policy has also gained in economic and 
demographic policy significance. And indeed in recent years – sometimes by means 
of cross-party alliances – considerable progress has been made.
  However, in Germany but also in many other countries (neo) conservative and right-
wing populist forces are marshalling against progressive gender and family policy. 
That is happening even in countries in which gender equality achievements long 
appeared to enjoy social consensus.
  This study brings together experiences and current family and gender policy debates 
from nine countries. It presents a broad comparative overview of the various 
approaches and debates in the countries concerned in concise reports.

1ON THE wAY TO GENDER EquALITY?  |   EIGENMANN ET AL.
Content
Foreword  
»Part of a culture war« . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
COuNTRY REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
1.  Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
1.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
1.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
1.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
2.  Denmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
2.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
2.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
2.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
3.  France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
3.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
3.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
3.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
4.  Germany  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
4.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
4.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
4.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
5.  Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
5.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
5.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
5.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
6.  Sweden  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
6.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
6.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
6.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
7.  Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
7.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
7.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
7.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
8.  united Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
8.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
8.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
8.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
9.  uSA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
9.1  Facts and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
9.2  Current Developments and Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
9.3  Positions and Discussions in the Centre-Left Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63

3ON THE wAY TO GENDER EquALITY?  |  FOREwORD  »PART OF A CuLTuRE wAR«
Foreword 
»Part of a culture war«
Progressive gender and family policy is not just a fuss 
about nothing, as former German chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder once put it. It is an important element of the 
platforms of centre-left parties and a central social 
modernisation project. That applies to Germany every 
bit as much as to other OECD countries. However, in 
Germany in particular there has been a widening gulf in 
recent years between young and middle-aged women 
and the Social Democrats. This estrangement has found 
expression in election results and party memberships, 
but also in a certain failure to communicate between the 
»political system« and potential activists.
That gives rise to the question of where the Social 
Democrats in Germany stand in relation to gender and 
family policy issues. Are they living up to their claim to 
modernity? Are they lagging behind by international 
comparison with regard to issues and standpoints? Do 
they have reason to hang their heads in shame in relation 
to the family and gender policy programmes of, for 
example, the Parti socialiste in France, the Labour Party 
in the United Kingdom of the Democrats in the United 
States? Have they developed plausible answers to the 
important questions of our time? Are there blind spots? 
But we must also ask whether debates are being held in 
other countries from which Germany could learn. What 
counterforces do progressive parties in other countries 
have to cope with and are they similar to those in 
Germany with regard to issues, rhetoric and mobilisation 
capacity?
Two years ago we at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung decided 
to address this question systematically. We began with an 
analysis of the gender and family policy debates in other 
countries in Europe and in North America, looking in 
particular at positions in the centre-left spectrum. To that 
end, in October 2014 we brought together international 
gender and family policy experts from political parties, 
think tanks and academia in Berlin to compare debates 
and to discuss the different approaches of progressive 
parties. On the agenda were questions such as: what 
particular gender policy issues require attention in which 
countries? How does the family and gender policy 
of the current government shape up? What issues 
are controversial? What have been the effects of the 
economic crisis on the debate and on concrete policies? 
What do the Social Democrats stand for? What positions 
are particularly controversial?
This document represents a first preliminary report. It is 
directed towards all those who are working on future-
oriented policy programmes. We provide initial portraits 
of nine countries with regard to their family and gender 
policy developments and conflicts, as well as the positions 
in the relevant centre-left spectrum: Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
This is very much a work in progress. In other words, we 
make no claim to completeness, nor would we like to 
give the impression that we are offering the last word. 
The aim is rather to provide a snapshot of a longer-
term and rapidly developing process – knowing perfectly 
well that in some places reality is likely to overtake the 
findings we present here in the not too distant future.
It should also be noted that our perspective is necessarily 
a German one, although reputed international experts 
were involved and the results of the international meeting 
in October  2014 have influenced the text (see the 
acknowledgements). Not least against this background 
we would welcome suggestions for improvements, ideas 
and remarks.
Nevertheless, a first preliminary result is that the German 
Social Democrats are very much up to date, at least in 
terms of their programme. In some aspects, such as time 
policy and the debate on the future of elderly care, which 
is a key gender policy issue, they are even at the forefront. 
However, they still have to overcome a number of – in 
particular communicative  – challenges. Many of these 
are specific to Germany, such as the as yet uncompleted 
unification of eastern and western Germany with regard 
to gender and family policy attitudes. Centre-left parties 
in many countries, in turn, face other challenges. For 
example, one might mention the resurgence of right-
wing populist movements. They are making headway 
in turning public opinion even among broad swathes 
of the political centre against progressive family and 
gender policy with their aggressive anti-gender rhetoric. 
Fancifully, they seek to discredit policies aimed at giving 
both women and men new opportunities as »outdated« 
and even »totalitarian«. Gender and family policy has 
thus become an embattled symbolic issue, indeed now 
part of a veritable culture war. It is still far from certain 
that progressive forces will come out on top.
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Not least for this reason we have to answer the question 
of how the social democratic parties can give their gender 
and family policy a voice and connect with people, and 
above all how they can get people on board with it 
again. What can be done to exercise a positive influence 
on the debate? We are keen to engage in dialogue with 
everyone who has an interest in shifting the argument in 
favour of centre-left positions in the future.
Dr Michael Bröning
Head of the International Policy Analysis division
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
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COuNTRY REPORTS
1.  Austria
1.1  Facts and Figures
  The European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender 
Equality Index for 2012 was 50.2 (out of 100). This 
represents a decrease compared to the first measurement 
in 2005 (50.5). Austria scores below the European 
average of 52.9.
  The gender pay gap, at 23 per cent, is slightly wider 
than that of Germany.
  The gender pension gap stands at 34 per cent.
  By contrast, transparency concerning wage inequality 
has improved of late. Since January 2014 all companies 
with over 150 employees have had a statutory obligation 
to publish gender-specific statistics on remuneration.
  Women’s labour-market participation, at 67 per cent, 
is relatively high; in 2013 the part-time employment rate 
of women was 46.9 per cent and that of men 10.9 per 
cent. Part-time employment has increased for both 
women and men over the past 20 years, although more 
sharply for women.
  The proportion of women in executive positions at 
Austria’s 200 largest companies by revenue is 5.9  per 
cent, while their membership of supervisory boards 
stands at 16.2  per cent. These figures have changed 
little over the past 10 years.
  In March  2011 the government introduced a self-
regulatory quota system for state-affiliated companies 
(state holding over 50 per cent). By the end of 2018 the 
proportion of women in the supervisory boards of such 
companies is supposed to be at least 35 per cent.
  In Parliament women’s representation is currently 
31 per cent, and almost half of all ministers are women. 
Austria has never had a female head of state. Women’s 
representation is particularly low at the local level. In 
2014 only 6 per cent of mayors were women.
  Family benefits in Austria are relatively generous: at 
just under 3 per cent they are above the OECD average of 
2.5 per cent. However, the focus is on monetary transfers 
(direct cash payments to families) and the proportion of 
spending on real transfers (especially support for public 
child care facilities) is unusually low.
  Maternity leave totals eight weeks before and after 
birth. During this period wage earners, the self-employed 
and unemployment benefit recipients receive their full 
last salary as maternity allowance (so-called »weekly 
benefit«).
  There is no statutory entitlement to paternity leave, 
although there is strong multilateral support for it. In 
early 2011 one month’s paternity leave was introduced 
for public servants and new fathers may now take up to 
one month’s unpaid leave. By the end of 2013 13 per 
cent of new fathers had exercised this option.
  Parental leave: »leave« is a labour-law concept and 
encompasses the legal entitlement to release from 
performance of work duties without pay. Employees are 
entitled to leave up to the end of the child’s second year. 
The period of leave can be split between the parents 
at most twice, for a minimum period of two months. 
Parents may not take leave at the same time for the 
same child. During the leave period no wage is paid, 
but childcare allowance can be applied for, paid up to 
a maximum of 36 months. The regulation on childcare 
allowance came into force in 2002 under the ÖVP/
FPÖ government coalition. It superseded the parental 
leave allowance existing since the late 1960s. There has 
been an earnings-related childcare allowance only since 
2010. At present, two systems are available, with five 
variants: a flat-rate benefit with four variants, as well 
as an earnings-related variant. Flat-rate benefits range 
from 12+2  months (around 1,000 euros/month) to 
30+6 months (around 436 euros/month). The earnings-
related variant covers 80  per cent (up to a maximum 
2,000 euros a month) of the wage for 12+2 months. The 
complexity of this system is often criticised.
  The introduction of the earnings-related variant led to 
a substantial increase in the proportion of fathers taking 
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paternity leave: of the couples who opt for this variant 
31  per cent of the men take paternity leave. Parental 
participation in child raising remains unequal, however; 
most fathers take only two months’ paternity leave. Most 
popular among parents (50 per cent) remains the longest 
flat-rate variant (30+6 months). The proportion of fathers 
taking paternity leave is lowest in this instance.
  After the end (or instead) of parental leave parents 
have a statutory entitlement to parental part-time 
employment (a reduction in normal working hours) up to 
their child’s seventh birthday. However, this entitlement 
is not accompanied by any additional financial benefits 
and, indeed, possible only under certain circumstances: 
first, the company has to have more than 20 employees 
and second, the claimant must have been working 
uninterruptedly at the firm for at least three years. In 
contrast to parental leave parental part-time employment 
can be taken by both parents at the same time.
  Child care development in Austria varies considerably 
(urban/rural). It is very good in urban areas. For a number 
of years care for children under six has been free of 
charge in Vienna in all state institutions and in the 
care institutions of large organisations. The last year of 
kindergarten in Austria is obligatory (half day) and free 
of charge.
  Of children under two years of age 23 per cent received 
institutional care in 2013; among children 3–5 years of 
age the figure was 91  per cent. The rates have risen 
sharply in the past 20 years.
  Since 2005, insured persons born after 1  January 
1955 predominantly taking care of a child may count up 
to four years (per child) towards pension insurance.
  There is no splitting of income tax between married 
couples in Austria; the principle of individual taxation 
applies. Financial relief for families thus depends on the 
presence of children.
  Care leave: since January 2014 employees have had 
the possibility of applying for up to three months’ care 
leave or part-time employment for care purposes to 
care for immediate family members. However, there is 
no statutory entitlement; in other words, the employer 
has to agree. The basic sum of care leave allowance 
is earnings-related and, like unemployment benefit, 
amounts to 55 per cent of net income; there is a lower 
limit, however.
  Registered partnerships were introduced in 2010. 
However, the Catholic-conservative wing of the ÖVP 
insisted on various, partly symbolic, differences from 
marriage: for example, ceremonies may not take place 
at the registry office, but at the district administrative 
authority. Adoption by same-sex couples is not 
permitted, but in December  2014 the Constitutional 
Court (VfGH G119-120/2014-12) ruled that the 
adoption ban on same-sex couples is unconstitutional. 
The unconstitutional provisions will thus cease to apply 
after 31 December 2015. Adoption of step-children has 
been possible since 2013. This change was made under 
pressure from the European Court of Human Rights.
1.2  Current Developments and Debates
In December  2013 Austria’s new government was 
appointed, known as »Faymann II«. It consists of a 
grand coalition between the Social Democratic Party 
of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). 
From 2000 to 2006 the SPÖ was in opposition. The ÖVP 
governed in coalition with the right-wing populist FPÖ 
(Freedom Party of Austria). From 2007 the SPÖ took 
power again, together with the ÖVP, and from 2008 
provided the chancellor Faymann. Since March 2014 the 
Federal Ministry for Education and Women has been 
responsible for equal opportunity policy at national 
level. This ministry resulted from the merger of the 
Ministry for Women (and Public Services), part of the 
Chancellor’s Office since 2007, and the former Ministry 
for Education, Art and Culture. The Ministry is headed by 
Gabriele Heinisch-Hosek (SPÖ), who headed the Ministry 
for Women and Public Services from 2008. The Ministry 
for Families and Young People (previously the Ministry 
for the Economy, the Family and Young People), which 
was also established in 2014, is headed by independent 
Sophie Karmasin, appointed by the ÖVP. Apart from the 
period 2000–2007, when the Family Ministry was in FPÖ 
hands, the ÖVP has provided the Family Minister since 
1987.
The Austrian government is obliged by federal law to issue 
»government reports on the removal of discrimination 
against women« every two years, detailing the measures 
taken. The first report was produced in 1996; during the 
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period 2011–2012, according to the 2013 report, the 
measures taken focused on the areas »active support 
for women« (labour market, school and occupational 
training, sexism, violence, health), »equal treatment in 
working life«, »reconciliation« and »social security«.
In Austria both gender mainstreaming and gender 
budgeting have been institutionalised at federal 
level. In 2000 the Interministerial Working Group for 
Gender Mainstreaming (IMAG GM) was established. 
It was supposed to implement the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming at federal level, in all federal ministries 
and at all political levels. At the same time, however, the 
government coalition (ÖVP/FPÖ) abolished the Ministry 
of Women’s Affairs and cut resources for supporting 
women. In 2002 the IMAG GM developed a work 
programme for implementing gender mainstreaming. 
Gender budgeting plays a key role in this programme and 
since 2009 has also been enshrined in the Constitution. 
Austria is thus playing a pioneering role in Europe. An 
interministerial working group on gender budgeting was 
set up as early as 2004. Since 2009 all ministries have 
implemented at least a pilot project on gender budgeting 
and since 2013 they have been obliged to pay specific 
attention to the goal of real equality of women and men 
in their budgeting. Although Austria stands out among 
the EU countries with this very early institutionalisation 
of gender budgeting there have been criticisms of its 
implementation. The view is that initiatives tend to get 
no further than pilot projects and no structural changes 
result. Furthermore, gender budgeting is often seen 
purely as a »technical exercise«: although budgets are 
analysed from a gender perspective the findings tend 
not to be converted into concrete measures. Another 
criticism is that unpaid work continues to be overlooked 
and thus plays no part in the budget. Overall, the view 
is that gender budgeting is rather »dormant« and its 
implementation depends very much on who happens to 
be in power.
Under the Faymann I government (SPÖ/ÖVP) in 2010 a 
»National Action Plan on the Equality of Women and 
Men in the Workplace« was developed by the Ministry 
for Women and Public Services. The overarching aims 
were: diversification of educational paths and choice of 
occupation, increasing the labour market participation of 
women and boosting full-time employment, increasing 
the proportion of women in executive positions and 
reducing the income gap between women and men.
Family Minister Sophie Karmasin (ÖVP) established the 
goal of making Austria the most family-friendly country in 
Europe by 2025. This would include, among other things, 
fulfilling people’s desire to have children, reconciling work 
and family life, partnership, combating violence against 
children and increasing awareness and take-up of family 
benefits and services. The development of these factors 
is to be supervised with an annual »family-friendliness 
monitor«. The stated aim of family-friendly policy for 
Karmasin (and the ÖVP in general) is to raise the birth 
rate.
In Austria – apart from in large cities such as Vienna – the 
day-care infrastructure is still poorly developed. Although 
the government is striving to attain the »Barcelona« 
target of care places for 33 per cent of children under 
three years of age, it is still a long way short of that, at 
23 per cent. All the parties are agreed on the fundamental 
need for expanding child care provision, albeit to various 
degrees and with different points of emphasis. The FPÖ is 
calling for more child care places, but it considers family 
care for children inherently superior to external care and 
under the slogan »genuine freedom of choice in the best 
interests of the child and professional development« is 
calling not only for the expansion of day-care provision 
but also for material support for parents who look after 
their children at home. Karmasin advocates a more even 
allocation of resources for family policy in cash and in 
kind, in particular more investment in the expansion of 
child care provision. She faces internal party opposition to 
this – the ÖVP rather favours tax concessions for families. 
In this way she is continuing the efforts at persuasion of 
Minister for Women Gabriele Heinisch-Hosek (SPÖ), who 
has been advocating the expansion of day-care facilities 
for many years, in particular with the argument that 
investment in infrastructure benefits all families equally, 
not, in contrast to tax concessions, primarily those on 
higher incomes. In June  2014 the federal government 
conferred its blessing on a »development offensive« 
for child care provision: over the next four years care 
provision is to receive a boost with a budget totalling 
305 million euros. As a result, more had already been 
spent by the end of 2014 than in the seven previous 
years. The expansion of all-day types of school is also 
being supported with an additional 800 million euros.
Minister for Women Gabriele Heinisch-Hosek has been 
supporting a »dads’ month« for years: men are supposed 
to be able to bring forward part of their paternity leave 
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and receipt of child care benefit to four weeks after the 
birth of the child – previously that was not possible if the 
mother is on maternity leave at the same time. Fathers 
can in this case take only a month of unpaid paternity 
leave, which most families cannot afford. Furthermore, 
hitherto such an entitlement has existed only in the 
public sector. The »dads’ month« is also a key demand 
of the Greens. Business representatives, by contrast, 
have opposed it. According to a study by the Chamber 
of Labour a large proportion of employees also oppose 
the statutory entitlement to a »dads’ month«. The 
Chamber of Commerce, which represents employers, 
agrees and justifies its position in terms of the current 
difficult economic situation. Reinhold Mitterlehner (ÖVP), 
up to 2013 Minister for the Economy, the Family and 
Young People, said in 2012: »In the current difficult 
economic situation companies have to prioritise their 
competitiveness and not another social benefit«. At 
present something of a change is occurring, however. At 
the end of 2013 Christoph Leitl, president of the Austrian 
Business Federation and president of the Chamber of 
Commerce, said »I am ready to seriously negotiate 
about everything.« The government programme of the 
Faymann II coalition merely states that the option of a 
»dads’ month« is to be looked into.
When earnings-related child care benefit was introduced 
in 2010 it satisfied a long-standing SPÖ demand. The 
declared aims were to encourage well educated women 
to have children and to increase the proportion of men 
taking paternity leave, which in fact has been achieved. 
Encouraging fathers to take paternity leave has long been 
demanded by SPÖ Minister for Women Gabriele Heinisch-
Hosek. From 2010 to 2013 she often campaigned on the 
slogan »real fathers take paternity leave«. The Greens are 
currently demanding the complete abolition of flat-rate 
variants in order to make paternity leave more attractive, 
mainly for higher earning men.
The current government also wants to revise child care 
benefit. A working group on the issue started work in 
September 2014. Whether the current flat-rate models 
will really be converted into a flexible »child care benefit 
account«, as laid down in the government programme, 
remains to be seen. According to Minister of Family Affairs 
(ÖVP) Sophie Karmasin, however, the goal is greater 
flexibility than is currently the case, as well as support for 
more partnership. Thus Karmasin is pondering a bonus 
for families that allocate child raising more equitably. 
The Greens are demanding that non-traditional family 
constellations also be taken into consideration with 
regard to child care benefit and that parents, siblings 
and new partners of single parents should also be able 
to apply for parental leave and child care benefit. One 
criticism of the current regulations on parental leave and 
child care benefit is that they encourage people to stay 
out of the workforce for too long.
In order to reduce the, by EU comparison, very high 
gender pay gap – currently 23 per cent – Austria a few 
years ago included an innovation in the Equal Treatment 
Act that obliges companies with 150 employees or 
more to make wages transparent and, for example, to 
reveal them to the works council. Furthermore, every 
two years an account must be provided in a report on 
income differences between women and men. The issue 
of »equal pay for work of equal value« is also gradually 
coming to the fore. The high wage differences between 
male occupations (such as mechanic) and female 
occupations (especially social occupations) are being 
addressed, although the debate is still in its infancy.
Another current gender and family policy debate concerns 
equality for same-sex couples. SPÖ Women’s Minister 
Heinisch-Hosek explicitly and emphatically advocates this 
issue, while the ÖVP is split on the matter. Family Minister 
Sophie Karmasin announced in March  2014 that she 
wanted to abolish unequal treatment for partnerships; 
with reservations she also wishes to stand up for adoption 
rights for same-sex couples. Before that, however, a 
process of awareness raising has to be set in train and 
discrimination combated. In February 2014, furthermore, 
ÖVP Minister of Agriculture Andrä Rupprechter departed 
from the party line and advocated full adoption rights for 
same-sex couples. The official position of the ÖVP is that 
a change in the law is not urgently necessary because 
demand for adoptions among heterosexual couples is 
ten times greater that the number of children available 
for adoption.
Another ideologically fraught debate concerns 
reproductive rights. Although abortions are not a 
criminal offence in Austria they are not covered by health 
insurance. This regulation served as a »model« for the 
Swiss referendum »abortion funding is a private matter«, 
which was resoundingly rejected in February  2014. In 
Germany although abortions are not generally covered 
by health insurance, people on low incomes can apply 
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for costs without having to disclose the reason for the 
termination. The number of terminations in Austria is 
two to three times higher than in Germany, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands. The lack of sex education in school 
and the lack of funding for contraceptives by health 
insurance are considered to be among the reasons for 
this. Unequal access is another problem in Austria: in 
Vorarlberg, Tirol and Burgenland public hospitals do 
not carry out any terminations; the only alternative is 
offered by a few private – and very expensive – institutes. 
In other public hospitals such procedures are offered 
irregularly (for example, once a month). The lack of 
cost regulation for abortions leads to a wide variation 
in prices (280–1,000 euros). The Austrian Women’s 
Circle (Österreichische Frauenring – ÖFR) is calling for a 
statutory upper limit of 300 euros and quality controls (in 
Vienna incidents occur time and again involving »cheap 
providers«). At present, the problematic situation with 
regard to abortions in Austria is denounced primarily by 
NGOs. But the SPÖ health minister has also advocated 
the option of abortions in all federal states in public 
hospitals. The debate about the so-called »morning-after 
pill« belongs in the same context. It has been available in 
Austria without a prescription since 2009. According to 
one survey in 2014, however, over 60 per cent of those 
questioned were unaware of this. The regulation has met 
with opposition above all from the bishops and the ÖVP.
One of the key issues of the Minister for Women is 
violence against women. The focus here is on combating 
domestic violence, but also so-called »tradition-based 
violence« (or violence in the form of traditional practices, 
such as female genital mutilation), which primarily affects 
men and women with an immigrant background. For 
the purpose of implementing the Council of Europe 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence (the »Istanbul 
Convention«), which Austria signed in 2013, the federal 
government adopted a »National Action Plan for the 
Protection of Women against Violence 2014–2016« in 
August 2014. In the media the issue of violence against 
women barely surfaces, however, in contrast to gender-
neutral language (see below) and family policy.
Another issue, which is discussed primarily in the 
political arena and to a lesser extent in the media, is the 
extension of protection against discrimination: in future, 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, religion, beliefs 
or age is to be prohibited, also outside the workplace (for 
example, when looking for accommodation). The SPÖ 
used the debates that arose after Conchita Wurst won 
the Eurovision Song Contest to launch a third attempt 
to bring about a »levelling up«. Austria is one of the 
last countries in which this EU directive has not yet been 
implemented. Family Minister Karmasin supports the 
scheme, but has encountered resistance from her party: 
in particular ÖVP Women oppose it.
A recurrent issue is sexism in advertising. Although 
there is no ban on sexist advertising in Austria, there 
is voluntary self-regulation by the Austrian Advertising 
Council, the Organisation for Self-Regulation in the 
Advertising Industry. For example, calling into question 
gender equality, the degrading representation of sexuality 
and the disparaging representation of persons who do 
not feel they belong to any dominant representation of 
gender are »proscribed«. In November 2011 an »anti-
sexism advisory council« was established, tasked with 
commenting on gender-discriminatory advertising. The 
directives of the Austrian Advertising Council enable 
proactive intervention (whereas the German Advertising 
Council can act only after a complaint has been made). 
In three Austrian cities (Graz, Salzburg and Vienna) so-
called »advertising watch groups« have been set up, 
which report sexist advertising to the Media Council or 
to the relevant city administration.
However, the main public debate on gender policy  – 
that is, outside expert circles – concerns gender-neutral 
language. At first glance, this may seem to be a 
peripheral matter, but in fact it is symbolically highly 
fraught and carries the danger for progressive parties that 
conservatives are able to »frame« the issue in a manner 
that suits them, namely (roughly speaking), in terms of 
Austrian identity and culture versus artificial-technocratic 
political correctness. At the centre of the debate are, on 
one hand, the national anthem and, on the other hand, 
the so-called »Binnen-I« (internal »I« used to indicate 
both male and female  – for example, »LehrerInnen« 
instead of »Lehrerinnen und Lehrer«). Concerning the 
first issue, the text of the national anthem was altered 
a few years ago: the line »You are a homeland to great 
sons« was replaced in 2011 by »You are a homeland to 
great daughters and sons«. The debate flared up (again) 
across the media when a folk singer Andreas Gabalier 
sang the national anthem at the Austrian Grand Prix in 
June 2014 pointedly using the old text to emphasise that 
Austria is only a »land of great sons«. When Minister for 
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Women Heinisch-Hosek pointed out Gabalier’s mistake 
via Facebook she was subjected to a deluge of abuse.
At the same time, a controversy raged about the 
»internal-I«, which was criticised from an unexpected 
quarter. In March  2011 the Committee for Regulation 
of the Written Language of the standardisation institute 
»Austrian Standards« issued a draft for a new standard 
(Önorm A 1080). In this draft it proposed that in future 
the internal-I should be dispensed with in favour of 
unisex formulations, justifying this view by saying that 
»our language has always been able to address both 
genders by means of unisex designations«. Trade unions, 
the Chamber of Labour, the Austrian National Union 
of Students (ÖH) and the SPÖ vehemently criticised the 
draft. Ernst Walburg, chair of the Committee, defended 
the draft as follows: »Language serves the purpose of 
uncontentious understanding and not the assertion of 
dubious political aims. … Equal treatment is an aim that 
must be pursued in the real world. What woman has 
ever been helped to get a better job or higher pay by 
the internal-I?« A heated public debate ensued, going 
on for several months, in which anti-feminist rhetoric 
played a major role. Later on, an open letter addressed 
to the Minister for Women and the Minister of Science, 
with 800 signatories, some of them prominent, called 
for a »return to linguistic normality«. Heinisch-Hosek 
defended gendered language at once. A counter-petition 
by the Women’s Circle in favour of gender-sensitive 
language quickly garnered 2,000 signatories. Also in 
connection with the debate on the internal-I the FPÖ 
called on Science Minister Reinhold Mitterlehner (ÖVP) 
to »cut off funding for gender mania« and to abolish all 
gender courses in universities.
1.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre Left Spectrum
Family and gender policy is currently not the main 
arena of dispute between the parties. However, there 
are  – beneath the apparent basic agreement that 
gender equality is necessary  – substantial differences. 
The positions of the SPÖ are, because it is currently a 
government party and provides the Minister for Women, 
predominantly consistent with the government positions 
presented above, and thus we shall not go into more 
detail here.
It is striking that the SPÖ, in contrast to the SPD in 
Germany, is very successful in attracting the support of 
young and middle aged women. Among women voters 
between 16 and 29 years of age – in Austria the voting 
age is 16 – support for the SPÖ stands at 30 per cent. 
By contrast, the SPÖ has a problem mobilising among 
young men, who currently have little enthusiasm for 
Social Democratic policies.
Despite the good approval ratings, especially among 
young women, the SPÖ is currently fighting two defensive 
battles on gender policy. On one hand, it has to contend 
with thinly veiled criticisms from the ÖVP concerning 
its supposed dogmatism on the issue. Although, 
according to its election programme, the ÖVP favours 
supporting women, it opposes »patronising« them. The 
ÖVP rhetorically adheres to a decidedly conservative 
difference-based feminism; for them, supporting women 
means facilitating a »career path in accordance with 
interests and strengths, equal pay for equal work and the 
free choice of family model«. This conceals the message 
that many women have different needs from men.
The second defensive battle is against the (FPÖ) position 
that supporting women is (i) out of date and (ii) today 
means discriminating against men. Underlying this is 
an attempt to roll back the achievements of gender 
policy, such as gender quotas and the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming. The FPÖ justifies its position as follows: 
»We decisively reject giving preference to one gender in 
order to remove real or alleged disadvantages. Statistically 
derived inequalities, which are due to a plethora of 
factors, cannot be compensated for by injustices against 
individuals.« When, at the same time, the Ministry for 
Women was abolished and gender mainstreaming 
enshrined in the Constitution under the ÖVP/FPÖ 
government in 2000 the government justified its actions 
by saying that the »old women’s policy« had achieved 
nothing. The SPÖ still has to contend with this reproach. 
The impetus to consolidate gender mainstreaming did 
not come from the government, however, but was  – 
like virtually all the other equality institutions at the 
federal level – part of the implementation of EU treaty 
provisions and directives. Europeanisation has thus 
been a key driving force in the institutionalisation of 
equal opportunity policy at the federal level. In 2001, on 
the initiative of the FPÖ, a »men’s policy department« 
was established at the Ministry for Social Security and 
Generations. The implication is that after the successes 
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of women’s emancipation thought must be given to the 
consequences of this for men. An interesting point here 
is the linking of the EU and gender. This is something of 
an Achilles heel.
Within the SPÖ there is a key debate on list places for 
elections. Currently, 17 out of the SPÖ’s 52 National 
Council seats are occupied by women, that is, 32.7 per 
cent. Thus the party has clearly failed to comply with 
its own statutes: the proportion of women is supposed 
to be above 40  per cent. At the party conference in 
2014 SPÖ Women mobilised for a tightening up of quota 
regulations in the party statutes. They called for sanctions 
against quota violations and for more eligible list places 
for women. According to the new regulation SPÖ 
regional organisations must in future put more women in 
list places that have some prospect of success in order to 
achieve the 40 per cent minimum quota. If this is violated 
in future the lists will be automatically »invalidated«. 
If an invalid list is not corrected by the regional party 
executive committee the federal executive committee 
will have to produce a regional party list in conformity 
with the party statutes. Regional parties are obliged to 
submit their lists to the federal executive committee 
»immediately after adoption by the regional executive 
committee«. As early as 2010 the »merging procedure« 
was agreed which prescribes that men and women must 
be put on lists on an alternate basis. The debate on 
tightening up the quota regulations became very heated 
and was conducted partly online; female party members 
have reported »hate speech« in the form of coarse 
insults and verbal attacks on women advocating tougher 
quotas. Optimists – probably rightly – consider this abuse 
to be the last gasp of a small minority trying to reignite a 
debate that ran its course long ago.
Current Gender-Policy Demands and Milestones of the 
SPÖ
The »dads’ month« in the public service is to be converted 
into a »baby month« and likewise to enable same-sex 
couples to spend the first month of a child’s life together.
The various aspects of the labour market represent a core 
issue of SPÖ Women’s political activities. At present, work 
is proceeding on an evaluation of the obligatory income 
reports and wage information in job advertisements. 
There are also continuing demands for a collectively 
agreed minimum wage of 1,500 euros, as well as no 
premature increase in women’s retirement age.
In 2016 a comprehensively revised Criminal Code comes 
into force, which is to contain an extended offense of 
sexual harassment, as well as recognition of violence in 
specific close personal relationships (such as the family) 
as an aggravating factor. A criminal offence of cyber-
bullying will also be introduced.
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2.  Denmark
2.1  Facts and Figures
  The European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender 
Equality Index for 2012 was 70.9 (out of 100). This 
represents a slight decrease compared to the first 
measurement in 2005 (71.1). Denmark still scores well 
above European average of 52.9.
  Individual taxation of income (since 1970).
  Shared right to parental leave and a right to paternity 
leave (since 1984); parental leave totals 52  weeks, of 
which 32 weeks can be freely divided between mother 
and father. The parental leave system does not explicitly 
provide for months or days of paternity leave, however. 
The proportion of fathers taking parental leave is very 
low, at 7.7  per cent. Among the Nordic countries 
Denmark’s parental leave system can thus be categorised 
as poorly developed.
  In Denmark all municipalities are obliged to provide 
a full-time child care place for all children between the 
ages of 6  weeks and 6  years (»guaranteed day-care 
availability«); 65.7 per cent of children under 2 years of 
age and 91.5 per cent of 3–5 year-olds receive external 
care. Child care costs are income-related.
  Women’s employment rate: 72.4 per cent (men: 79 per 
cent), of whom 37.9 work part-time (men: 15.3  per 
cent); around 53 per cent of all women in employment 
are employed in the public sector (men: 24.5 per cent).
  The gender pay gap, at 14.9 per cent, is in line with 
the EU average.
  Denmark’s pension system is organised in such a way 
that a temporary reduction of workload for the purpose 
of child raising is well compensated. If the reduction lasts 
fewer than 10 years, the pension is almost as high as for 
full-time workers.
  Women occupy 23 per cent of executive positions in 
private companies. However, at present the boards of 
Denmark’s largest companies comprise only 16 per cent 
women and there is not a single CEO. In 2012 the then 
Social Democratic government passed a law that obliges 
the 1,100 largest firms in the country to set targets for 
the representation of women at executive level.
  Five out of 17 ministries in the new right-wing-liberal 
government are headed by women.
  In 1989 Denmark became the first country to 
introduce registered partnerships for same-sex couples. 
Marriage was made an option for same-sex couples in 
2012. Adoption has been allowed for same-sex couples 
since 2010 (in Greenland only for the adoption of 
stepchildren).
2.2  Current Developments and Debates
Equal opportunity policy has a long tradition in Denmark 
and is strongly institutionalised. It is a central component 
of Danish social democracy’s success story. The Danish 
model is characterised by a relatively equal distribution 
of qualifications and incomes, an extensive public 
sector, high labour market participation among women 
and a high tax ratio, which makes it possible to fund 
extensive, high quality public services (for example, social 
infrastructure, such as education, child care, care for the 
elderly and so on).
In the early period of equal opportunity policy the focus 
was on the issue of women and work. As early as 1965 
the government set up a commission to investigate the 
situation of women in society. In 1975 a Gender Equality 
Council was established. A law on equal pay was passed 
in 1976 and one on gender equality in the social security 
system in 1998.
The first national action plan for gender equality cov-
ered the period 1987–1990; since 2002 annual reports 
and action plans have been issued by the Ministry for 
Gender Equality. The first Minister for Gender Equality (a 
woman: the first male minister was appointed in 2011) 
was appointed in 1999. Gender mainstreaming was laid 
down as a strategy for the first time in the action plan 
for 1994–1996 and embedded in the amended equal op-
portunity law in 2000. Since then gender mainstreaming 
has played an important role in Danish equal opportunity 
policy: the gender equality perspective is defined as a 
cross-sectional task for all policy areas and ministries.
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An important cross-regional body is the Nordic Gender 
Equality Cooperation of the Nordic Council of Ministers. 
It promotes the exchange and discussion of experiences 
between the Nordic countries and offers a platform for 
developing joint strategies. The Cooperation body has 
done a lot to implement the principle of gender main-
streaming in the Nordic countries. In 2013 it launched 
a project to investigate and compare the effects of 
gender mainstreaming: the Nordic Project on Gender 
Mainstreaming – Best Practice and Effects. The current 
programme for 2015–2018 brings the areas of »public 
space« and »welfare and innovation« back into focus. 
The first includes in particular measures to improve equal 
participation in and influence over decision-making pro-
cesses, as well as equal access to the media, counter-
acting the increasing sexualisation of public space and 
the anti-gender movement. The second encompasses 
especially measures for implementing equal access to ed-
ucation and opportunities for free personal development 
for women and men. Also included are projects designed 
to ensure equal access to the labour market and the 
financial independence of women and men.
A recurring theme of the public and political debates on 
gender and family policy in Denmark is an emphasis on 
the fact that, while Denmark, like all Nordic countries, is 
an international role model with regard to equality and 
considers this to be an important aspect of its national 
self-image, there is still a long way to go before complete 
equality is attained. There have been criticisms that the 
Nordic countries have become complacent about their 
status as pioneers with regard to equality. The objection 
that no further improvements can be made is not valid. 
In some instances, problems first raised in the 1970s have 
still not been solved. For example, at the conference of 
Nordic ministers of gender equality in June 2014 »classic 
issues« such as domestic violence, gender segregation on 
the labour market and wage inequality between women 
and men were discussed.
In Denmark there is a basic consensus within the political 
party spectrum concerning the gender equality policy 
standard that has been achieved and the significance 
of gender equality policy. The sole exception is the 
Dansk Folkeparti (DF; Danish People’s Party), whose 
position is that equality between men and women was 
achieved long ago and that all gender-policy activities, 
such as gender mainstreaming or gender quotas, thus 
discriminate against men. The DF has long been more 
than a fringe party: at the parliamentary elections in 2015 
it was the second strongest party, at 21.1 per cent, and 
won 37 of the 179 seats. The 2015 election campaign 
was dominated by the debate on the right immigration 
and asylum policy. Accordingly, equality policy received 
little attention and there was little discussion of the 
positions of the different parties.
From 2001 to 2011 Denmark was led by a minority 
government made up of the conservative-liberal Venstre 
and the Conservative People’s Party (DKF) with the tacit 
support of the DF. Gender policy stagnated during these 
years. After the parliamentary elections in September 
2011 a minority government was formed under Prime 
Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt comprising the Social 
Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party and the Social 
Liberal Party. The accession of the first woman prime 
minister in Denmark gave rise to considerable expectations 
of an active equal opportunity policy after years in the 
doldrums, which indeed had seen the clock turned back 
as far as gender equality is concerned, measured by the 
quality of public infrastructure, for example. In the 2011 
election campaign the Social Democrats made much of 
this regression, complaining that the gender balance was 
being tipped in the wrong direction and that equality 
between men and women with regard to pay and 
influence remained a distant goal.
In the coalition agreement equal opportunity policy 
and gender issues were a key focus. The main issues 
were a ban on the purchase of sexual services based 
on the Swedish model, which criminalises the utilisation 
of prostitution but not the offer of such services, and 
the introduction of three months reserved exclusively 
for fathers within the framework of parental allowance, 
again modelled on regulations in other Nordic countries.
The gender and equality policy achievements of the 
centre-left government that was in power until summer 
2015 are rather disappointing, however. During the 
legislative period the government and especially the social 
democratic leadership evidently put the equality policy 
agenda on ice. This neglect of equality policy measures 
and initiatives was explained in terms of the economic 
and financial crisis in Europe and the resulting relatively 
poor labour market and economic situation in Denmark. 
No clear vision for equality policy was discernible on the 
part of the centre-left government. Rather debates were 
held on, for example, everyday sexism and the distribution 
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of family care between generations (the responsibility of 
grandparents); specific gender policy measures were not 
forthcoming, however.
In 2014 the Ministry for Gender Equality and Church 
was renamed the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, 
Integration and Social Affairs. Since the new government 
took office it has been known as the Ministry for Children, 
Education and Equality (no Danish ministry has the word 
»family« in its name).
As a matter of course the Social Democrat government 
developed another national action plan in 2014. 
According to the plan, topical activities were envisaged 
in the areas of gender and education; gender equality 
in the labour market; family and gender equality; men 
and health; and an evaluation of the gender ratio in the 
public sector. The areas »gender equality as a human 
right« and »gender equality in a global perspective« are 
also listed.
Regardless of the fact that the previous and the present 
government have not pursued the issues, the debates 
on prostitution and the introduction of non-transferable 
months in the parental benefit act in Denmark continue.
An important role in the intensive and controversial 
debate on prostitution and people trafficking has been 
played by the evaluation report, published in 2010, on 
the Swedish law that came into force in 1999 banning 
the purchase of sexual services. The report shows that 
in Sweden the number of people involved in street 
prostitution has halved, while in Denmark and Norway 
it has tripled during the same period. Although at the 
same time the number of services offered online has 
increased in all Nordic countries  – including Sweden – 
it is still well below the number in countries without 
such legislation. Even though the significance of such 
data has been criticised – prostitution has been pushed 
underground  – they do exert some sort of pressure 
on other Nordic countries to introduce similar laws. 
To date, a more liberal approach has been taken to 
prostitution in Denmark than in neighbouring countries. 
The purchase of sexual services is not prohibited. In 
contrast to Sweden, in Denmark social work with 
prostitutes does not concentrate on getting them to 
give up their activities, but on reducing possible negative 
consequences and dangers: for example, sex workers 
receive free contraception and medical treatment. The 
public debate is polarised between those who favour a 
total ban on prostitution and those who consider that 
approach to be too simplistic and moralising. In 2011 
the then Ministry of Gender Equality, together with seven 
other ministries and various NGOs, issued an »Action 
Plan to combat human trafficking«. One of the catalysts 
of the debate on human trafficking for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation was the campaign »Stop trafficking 
of women« launched by the Union Federation of Danish 
Workers (Fagligt Fælles Forbund or »3F«) in 2008. An 
article had appeared in the trade union’s newspaper in 
which a journalist described the sale of a 16-year-old 
girl by human traffickers in Romania, to show how easy 
human trafficking is. The story caused a scandal and 
3F collected over 100,000 signatures for a petition to 
demand political action. Later on, 3F called for a total 
ban on prostitution. That was the first time a trade union 
had taken up the issue.
Despite announcements to the contrary, the Social 
Democratic government did not, during its term of office, 
initiate a law introducing »non-transferable parental 
leave for fathers« continues to be broadly debated. 
The lack of parental leave explicitly for fathers is also 
discussed as a major reason for discrimination against 
women in the labour market. Although employers are 
officially prohibited from declining to hire a woman 
because they fear she may soon have children, in reality 
that often happens. With regard to paternity leave there 
are striking differences between companies. In some 
collective agreements and companies special regulations 
on paternity leave are already in place. In contrast to other 
Nordic countries, in Denmark the association between 
masculinity and (full-time) work remains widespread; the 
issue of masculinity and equality is little discussed and, 
furthermore, there is little official criticism of norms of 
masculinity.
In recent years one particular focus of equal opportunity 
policy has been the still strongly gender-specific career 
choices and training trajectories. In 2011 the then 
government launched a pilot project to encourage girls 
and young women in natural sciences and technology. 
After a positive evaluation in 2012 ten further projects 
followed on gender-specific career choice, as well as 
to get young people to remain longer in the education 
system.
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In February  2014 the Nordic Council discussed the 
possibility of a »gender equality labelling« system for 
Nordic schools. Schools that take an active approach 
to combating gender stereotypes should be awarded a 
special label. The idea was originally conceived by Danish 
sociologist Cecilie Nørgaard as a national initiative for 
Denmark. The proposal has been strongly welcomed, 
with only the Swedish National Union of Teachers 
showing scepticism, on the grounds that they consider 
equal opportunity policy to be a national affair, to be 
implemented via legislation and monitoring instruments, 
not competition between schools. The background of 
the proposal is the poor performance of boys in Nordic 
schools. According to the initiator of the labelling system 
this poor performance is due to an upbringing in a form 
of masculinity that is averse to sitting still and listening.
For several years there has been a tendency for debate on 
gender equality to link up with debates on integration and 
immigration. In recent months a debate on the wearing 
of headscarves has been kindled in this context. In this 
debate, however, gender equality appears to serve rather 
as a smokescreen for a discussion that really concerns the 
position of religion in Danish society.
2.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
A key concept in the Social Democrats’ gender-policy 
programme is, currently, »genuine equal opportunities«: 
Denmark should be a country in which girls and boys, 
as well as women and men, have genuine equal 
opportunities.
In order to combat discrimination against women 
in the labour market  – for example, the gender pay 
gap of 14.9  per cent  – the Danish Social Democrats 
are calling for a parliamentary commission on equal 
opportunities. To date, national wage statistics have not 
been differentiated by gender, which makes researching 
the gender pay gap more difficult. Since 2013 larger 
companies have been obliged to include gender in their 
wage statistics.
With regard to child care the Danish Social Democrats 
emphasise quality, which has been deteriorating for 
years. The idea now is to improve quality by imposing 
a minimum standard for staff and having fewer days 
when child care institutions are closed. The reasoning put 
forward concerns better opportunities for children rather 
than gender equality: with regard to child care quality is 
really a matter of eliminating social deprivation.
Further gender and family policy positions of the Danish 
Social Democratic party:
  Establishment of parental leave/a parental benefit 
fund for the self-employed.
  Single mothers by choice should be on the same 
footing as other single parents, for example, with regard 
to »special child allowance« (saerlige børnetilskud).
  The issue of »boys losing out in the education system« 
should be addressed by comprehensive measures for 
those dropping out of school and training. Such measures 
should, among other things, prevent discrimination on 
the grounds of gender or ethnicity in the allocation of 
training places.
Controversial demands/plans
One component of the party programme is non-
transferable parental leave for fathers. There is a clear 
conflict in the Danish Social Democratic party because the 
Social Democratic government put parental allowance 
reform on ice. They justified this on the basis of surveys 
in which citizens oppose such a reform, although we 
can also assume that the costs of such a reform are 
crucial here. The party base, by contrast, called for the 
implementation of reform.
In 2013 the then Social Democratic government 
passed a new law on the representation of women 
in higher management. It stipulates that the 1,100 
largest Danish companies and all state institutions must 
develop guidelines on how many women they want in 
management and what strategies they intend to use 
to achieve it. However, no quotas or other binding 
provisions are laid down in the law. This is contrary to 
the demand laid down in the party programme for a 
40 per cent quota.
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Other important actors
  The Board of Equal Treatment (»Ligebehandlingsnæv-
net«): Since 2009 there has been a complaints office to 
which complaints concerning unequal treatment of any 
kind – including on gender grounds – can be submitted. 
The decisions of this body are based on the existing laws 
and are binding.
  Denmark’s Centre for Information on Women and 
Gender (KVINFO): KVINFO is a national documentation, 
information and culture centre. The Centre has an 
academic library and an extensive expert database.
  The Danish Institute for Human Rights: »In Denmark, 
the Danish Institute for Human Rights has served as 
the national body for equal treatment since 2002, and 
since 2011 the mandate also includes gender equality. 
The Institute is an independent state-funded institution 
tasked to promote equal treatment regardless of gender 
and other factors and [to] ensure compliance with 
Denmark’s discrimination legislation.«
  NGOs: NGOs play an important role in Danish equal 
opportunity policy, especially the »Danish Women’s 
Society and Women’s Council«, an umbrella organisation 
for 46 women’s organisations. NGOs participate actively 
in public debates, disseminate knowledge and have an 
important consultative function for government (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2013).
  Trade unions: Within the »blue-collar« trade union 
federation LO equal opportunity policy issues are central. 
Although, in the public perception, the trade unions do 
not play a leading role in the formulation and discussion 
of equal opportunities, there is an extensive discourse 
on gender issues among the trade unions. For example, 
during Copenhagen Pride in September 2014 LO directed 
its own campaign towards LGBT in trade unions and 
female polemicists, writers and leaders. Lizette Risgaard, 
deputy chair of LO Denmark, has made issues of gender 
equality in the labour market (income gap, gender 
separation in the labour market) a focus of trade union 
work.
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3.  France
3.1  Facts and Figures
  Due to the statutory 35-hour week many women 
(around 70 per cent) are able to work full time.
  A women’s quota for supervisory boards and executive 
boards in private companies was introduced in 2014.
  Despite stringent financial penalties for political parties 
that fail to comply with the Equality Act the proportion of 
women in the French Parliament is still only 27 per cent.
  Despite a child care system that is extensive by 
European standards it is estimated that a further between 
300,000 and 500,000 child care places are still needed.
  For a long time there was no parental leave in France 
for mothers with one or two children. Only in 1994 
were mothers with at least two children granted a three-
year »baby break«. Mothers with one child received six 
months off only from 2004. Accordingly, mothers in 
France tend to remain in work after their first child.
  Only 17 per cent of mothers with one child interrupt 
their employment within the framework of parental 
leave. For mothers with two children the rate is 33 per 
cent. The employment rate of mothers with a small child 
is thus 85.5 per cent. Even in the case of mothers with 
two children, with one child below 3 years of age the 
employment rate is 76.2 per cent. Only from the third 
child does the employment rate fall substantially, to 
54.1 per cent. It is remarkable, however, that a majority 
of mothers with at least three children – including those 
whose youngest is under 3 years of age – continue in 
employment. All in all, the employment rate of mothers 
with one or two minor children is almost as high as that 
of childless women.
  Parental allowance stands at 576 euros a month for 
births up to March 2014. For births after April 2014 it 
is 390 euros or 576 euros, depending on the level of 
household income.
3.2  Current Developments and Debates
In Germany, France is held to be a model with regard 
to gender equality. This judgement is nourished by the 
fact that in France it is evidently easier for women to 
reconcile work and family life. Gender equality in France, 
indeed, for a long time meant gender equality in the 
workplace. For French governments – regardless of party 
colours – the primary task was to support women’s full-
time employment and in particular through an active 
family policy favouring reconciliation of work and family 
life. Both career interruptions and part-time work were 
supposed to be avoided as far as possible. Part-time work 
is regarded in France as, at best, »pis aller«, in other 
words, as the lesser evil in comparison with a long-term 
career interruption. The French 35-hour week makes 
it easier to reconcile family and full-time employment, 
even though naturally it cannot completely solve time 
conflicts.
This relatively high employment participation among 
mothers in France can thus be linked to the institutional 
framework. It is a condition for receiving parental 
allowance that parents were in employment before the 
birth of the child. In the case of a first birth the parent 
who claims parental leave has to have been in work 
for at least two years, in the case of a second birth for 
at least two years out of the past four and in the case 
of a third child for at least two years out of the past 
five. Accordingly, parents cannot remain permanently 
on parental leave. They have to go back to work in the 
meantime. Nonetheless, parental allowance is not linked 
to wages. Rather it takes the form of a – relatively low – 
lump sum, which scarcely encourages those in full-time 
employment, particularly in the higher wage segment, 
to claim parental leave. Furthermore, taking on part-
time employment within the framework of parental 
leave was promoted from 2004 by raising part-time 
parental allowance. Parents who are in work up to 50 per 
cent of the regular working week receive 438 euros a 
month, while those in work from 50 to 80 per cent of 
the working week receive 331 euros a month. Thus the 
proportion of mothers who remain in employment within 
the framework of parental leave has risen sharply. By 
2010 it was already at 43 per cent.
The main instrument for boosting employment 
participation among mothers, however, was the 
expansion of child care. All children above 3  years of 
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age go to school. French preschool (école maternelle) is 
already part of the school system and offers families with 
children between 3 and 5 years of age all-day child care, 
free of charge, from trained primary school teachers. This 
all-day child care, which has a long tradition, stretches 
until the school-leaving exam and is supplemented for 
pre- and primary school children by child care in day-
care centres before and after school and in so-called 
recreation centres on Wednesday afternoons and during 
the holidays, if the schools are closed. For small children 
there is the option of child care outside the home in 
heavily subsidised crèches by state-approved child 
minders – the equivalent of child day care in Germany – 
or by nannies. Crèches are heavily subsidised; parents’ 
financial contribution depends on income. Parents 
receive a monthly grant for hiring a child minder or 
nanny, so that they do not have to bear the full cost 
of child care. The grant can be 174 euros, 290 euros 
or 460 euros a month, depending on income. Finally, 
parents who hire a child minder pay only 50  per cent 
of social security contributions  – the rest is borne by 
the Caisse d’Allocations Familiales (Family Allocations 
Office, CAF) – and they also receive a financial grant that 
depends on age, number of children and income. On top 
of this, part of the child care costs – whether crèche, child 
minder, nanny, day-care centre or recreation centre  – 
can be claimed against tax for children up to 6  years 
of age. There are also tax benefits from the so-called 
family allowance (»tax splitting«). The number of minor 
children living in the household are taken into account in 
calculating income tax. By contrast, other direct financial 
aid in France is fairly modest. Parental allowance is paid 
only from the second child and only in the amount of 
129 euros for the first two children, 295 euros for three 
children and 166 euros for each further child.
Family policy was long one of the few areas in which 
there was a certain consensus between left and right. 
This is in keeping with the French »mixed system«; female 
employment is supported just as much as traditional 
families with lots of children. Hitherto, the relatively high 
family benefits have ensured that both family models 
felt well supported and with options. It is also certainly 
the reason why the image of mothers in France is less 
clearly defined and thus less restrictive than in many 
other countries. However, family policy has always 
been subject to criticism. First, the target was the level 
of parental allowance. Parental allowance amounts to 
576 euros a month, regardless of income, which can be 
attractive to the low-qualified, but not so much for those 
on higher wages. Thus parental leave take-up is higher 
among low income women with atypical working time 
and/or dissatisfied with their job, which thus is leading to 
a gap in women’s career trajectories. Above all, however, 
French family policy is reproached with doing little to 
encourage parents to distribute family responsibilities 
on a partnership basis. Although French parental leave is 
very flexible because there is no minimum duration and 
parents can claim it both together and also successively, 
because of the relatively low parental allowance only just 
over 3.5 per cent of fathers take parental leave in France. 
The level of parental allowance plays a major role here 
because fathers claim parental leave primarily when they 
earn less than their wives. In France women’s burdens 
are relieved more by the state – or by child minders and 
domestic help, in other words by other women with 
lower qualifications – than by their partners, so that the 
high female employment participation does not find 
expression in a balanced distribution of gender roles.
Furthermore, the need for child care for small children 
is not being met. The ratio between number of children 
and available places is currently 53  per cent, which, 
given regional differences, is not sufficient; in particular 
in rural areas there is a lack of crèche places, demand for 
which has increased due to the rise in the birth rate in 
recent years. At present, every second child is cared for 
predominantly by its own parents, in other words, usually 
by the mother. Although this partly reflects parents’ 
wishes – surveys have shown that a third of the French 
population think that the care of small children should 
be provided by the parents – it is partly due to the lack 
of infrastructure.
Finally, family tax splitting is controversial because it 
favours those on higher incomes. Thus there are demands 
from academia to abolish it and to invest the money 
saved in nationwide and free child care provision for 
small children on the Swedish model, a proposal which 
is only partly viable, because child care costs are not 
restricted to the first three years.
Although there is a consensus in France that a lot 
remains to be done with regard to family policy and 
gender equality, despite their anchoring in the 1946 
Constitution, and that family policy assistance should 
be expanded, a shift has been evident since 2012. For 
the first time for decades family policy is being cut. And 
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for the first time for decades people are taking to the 
streets because of family policy, to protest against very 
different kinds of reform: against the disadvantageous 
tax position of families, but also against the campaign 
against gender-based prejudice in primary schools, and 
against medically assisted reproduction and surrogate 
motherhood for same-sex couples, although the latter 
has not been seriously debated. The long consensus on 
family policy in France has disappeared overnight.
Because of the financial crisis the French state has been 
under budgetary pressure for quite some time. It is true 
that in the past reforms that resulted in financial losses 
for families were a regular occurrence, but they were 
mainly indirect, due to measures not directed at families 
specifically. Thus the reform of 2010 provided for a rise 
in the retirement age from 60 to 62 years of age based 
on 43  years’ contributions, up from 40. This measure 
was detrimental above all to mothers, because their 
interruption of employment and part-time work caused 
them more difficulties than fathers in obtaining a full 
pension. Such and similar reforms were accepted by the 
French public as a necessary evil. Things are very different 
with the most recent family-policy reforms.
It is true that under the Sarkozy government there 
was already an attempt to reduce the rise in spending 
associated with the rising birth rate. One way was to try 
to make savings in the expansion of child care. Under 
the Socialist Hollande government, however, financial 
assistance for families has been cut. The tax benefits 
enjoyed by families through family tax splitting was 
restricted from 2014. Although this reform affected 
primarily those on higher incomes, it meant that another 
10,000 households were now liable to pay income tax. 
The pension bonus for large families – plus 10 per cent 
for three children, on top of which there is an additional 
5 per cent for each further child for public employees – 
is now subject to income tax, which in 2014 affected 
315,000 families. Child allowance, which is in any case 
very low by international comparison (129 euros for 
families with two children) is to be cut for those on higher 
incomes from 1 July  2015. For births from April 2014 
onwards families on higher incomes are entitled to only 
390 euros or 482 euros parental allowance per month at 
an income threshold of 45,077 euros or 37,733 euros for 
dual earners or one-parent families with one child. The 
basic allowance that families receive up to their children’s 
third birthday depends on income. Dual earners and one-
parent families with one child and an income between 
37,734 euros and 45,077 euros now receive only 92 
euros a month instead of 185 euros. Above a threshold 
of 45,077 euros the basic allowance has been entirely 
done away with; those on middle incomes are also 
affected by this. The income threshold has been lowered 
with regard to the basic allowance. The income threshold 
of single-earner couples has been reduced to a lesser 
extent, which means that the employment incentive for 
low-earning women has diminished.
Although the state has saved 3.45 billion euros through 
its reforms, in comparison with the 90 billion euros or so 
that the state spends on families each year these social 
cuts represent a fairly modest sum and affect mainly 
the higher income deciles to boot. Nevertheless these 
reforms triggered a wave of indignation, as is evident 
from the media and the demonstrations in 2014, which 
labelled the French government ›anti-family‹. There are 
several reasons for this. On one hand, other measures 
to increase taxes were introduced at the same time. For 
example, those in employment now have to pay tax on 
employers’ health insurance contributions. Above all, 
however, income from active capital is now taxed at the 
same rate as employment income – it has been criticised 
as taking a rather indiscriminate »lawnmower« approach. 
Even though at the same time taxes on over 2 million 
households in the lowest deciles were cut by 1.26 billion 
euros, nonetheless 1.35  million households now pay 
tax for the first time. Thus the reforms also affected 
low-income households, which in France met with little 
sympathy, especially from a Socialist government. Given 
the high public deficit – 4.0 per cent of GDP in 2014 – 
and pressure from the European Commission the French 
government has to prioritise, but many French people 
are angry that cuts affecting families are being used to 
fund the »national pact for growth, competitiveness 
and employment«, which, among other things, relieves 
companies by means of a »tax credit for competitiveness 
and employment« (Crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité 
et l’emploi, CICE).
Primarily the public indignation is due to the symbolic 
function of family policy. In France, there has always 
been a consensus on the role of family policy in relation 
to the relatively high birth rate. French family policy was 
regarded as exemplary, a success story – at present one 
of the few  – even though academics rather take the 
view that the high birth rate is owing to the measures 
20
ON THE wAY TO GENDER EquALITY?  |  FRANCE
implemented to reconcile work and the family, which 
remain unaffected by the reforms.
The real triggers of the protest movement, however, 
were the introduction of marriage and later adoption 
rights for same-sex couples – they generated a general 
suspicion of family policy reforms. This can be observed 
in connection with giving step-parents some child-
rearing responsibilities, adopted in summer 2014. With 
this reform step parents can obtain the right to pick up 
the children of their partner from school or take them 
to a doctor, if the birth parents agree. Although this 
reform would undoubtedly make everyday life easier 
for »patchwork« and step families, it encountered 
fierce criticism, which would otherwise appear to be 
disproportionate to the limited scope of the reform, 
which by no means establishes genuine step-parent 
status. It was suggested, among other things, that the 
idea was to substitute natural parents with step-parents, 
regardless of the fact that the child rearing responsibilities 
in question are possible only with the agreement of 
the natural parents. It appears that in certain quarters 
any family policy initiative on the part of the Socialist 
government is suspicious. Ulterior motives are alleged 
behind any reform, so that its ramifications are suspected 
of being greater than they really are.
The wave of protests – »Manif pour tous!« – triggered by 
the introduction of marriage and adoption rights for same-
sex couples was much bigger than had been anticipated. 
The demonstrators were less concerned with the 
marriage issue than with adoption. Most demonstrators 
ostensibly criticise the conferring of adoption rights, as 
well as the option of artificial insemination and surrogacy 
for same-sex couples, even though neither artificial 
insemination and surrogacy are mentioned in the legal 
text. François Hollande declared, on the contrary, that 
these reforms would not bestow such rights, but it was 
generally believed that the government would not keep 
its word and that sooner or later the issues of artificial 
insemination and surrogacy would be taken up again. 
This is also due to the fact that Justice Minister Christiane 
Taubira, as well as François Hollande have spoken out 
in favour of artificial insemination. At the urging of the 
European Court of Justice the French government has 
also committed itself to entering in the civil register the 
status of children given birth to by surrogate mothers 
abroad but living in France. For many demonstrators, 
however, this is tantamount to recognition of surrogacy. 
Ultimately, the public has not forgotten that the Socialist 
government, when PACS – a contract similar to a civil 
partnership  – was introduced in 1999, declared that 
there would be no marriage and adoption rights for 
same-sex couples. The aim of the demonstrators is not 
so much to roll back the reforms, which most realise is 
unrealistic, even though former president Nicolas Sarkozy 
declared at an event in the context of the UMP1 leadership 
campaign on 15 November 2014 that he would to scrap 
the law if he was elected president in 2017, which gave 
rise to criticisms even within his own party. Rather the 
demonstrators want to stop any further reforms dead 
in their tracks. However, the opinions expressed on the 
streets are not representative of the majority: one opinion 
poll indicated that most people favour the legalisation of 
surrogacy and the right of same-sex couples to artificial 
insemination.
Given the unexpected vehemence of the protests, 
however, the government has shelved a number 
of reforms. The project to raise awareness of gender 
stereotypes among primary school children was dropped. 
Also the birth premium of 923 euros that the government 
wanted to abolish from the second child onwards was 
retained, as well as the increase in child allowance for 
14  year-olds and tax relief for families that employ a 
child minder, although these measures primarily affect 
higher earners.
Other family-policy proposals discussed in the election 
campaign, mainly costly ones, such as child allowance 
on the Swedish model, were off the table from the very 
outset, due to the economic situation and austerity 
policy. Since 2004 parents are entitled to parental leave 
of six months for the first child and three years for 
further children. The reform envisaged a prolongation 
of parental leave for the first child for the other parent – 
usually the father  – by six months and reserving them 
at least six months’ parental leave for further children. 
In other words, mothers would be able to claim two 
and a half years’ parental leave at most. The reform did 
not come into force because the government is now 
investigating the possibility of going one step further 
and dividing parental leave equally between the two 
parents. Parents would thus be entitled to a maximum of 
one and a half years’ parental leave. This plan has come 
1.  Since May 2015 the UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire) has 
changed its name into LR (Les Républicains).
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in for much criticism, however. It cannot be assumed 
that the proportion of fathers claiming parental leave 
would rise substantially until parental allowance assumes 
the same kind of wage replacement function as in, say, 
Germany and certainly not for 18 months. Even in the 
Scandinavian countries, where paternity leave has long 
been much better remunerated, parental leave is taken 
by only a minority of fathers and seldom for more than 
three months. Thus the thrust of the reform is unrealistic. 
Furthermore, many people consider the government’s 
talk of equality duplicitous: in other words, it isn’t really 
a question of promoting gender equality, but rather of 
saving money by sharply cutting parental leave, as in the 
case of its tax measures. If fathers did not take up their 
parental leave option or only to a limited extent, another 
child care solution would have to be found. However, 
current child care provision is not sufficient to cover any 
substantial rise in demand. If parents do not manage to 
obtain a child care place, however, the question arises 
of whether women would be forced to give up work, 
which would further weaken the position of mothers on 
the labour market. This reform has still not been passed. 
Based on the opposition to it on both left and right its 
prospects are uncertain.
However, there is something to be said for the reforms 
of the past few years. Besides the abovementioned 
introduction of certain child-raising rights for step-parents 
the Gender Equality Act passed on 5 August 2014 clearly 
represents an important advance, in terms of both the 
scope and variety of the instruments applied. First of all, 
the campaign against sexist stereotypes is to be stepped 
up, in particular through tighter control of the media 
and the internet and a ban on beauty contests for under 
13s. The expression »en bon père de famille« (as a good 
father would) has been removed from the Code Civil with 
reference to the responsibility of a head of household to 
act in the best interests of his family (to be replaced with 
the words »reasonable« or »reasonably«). Furthermore, 
more will be done to combat violence against women. 
This includes, for example, the systematic challenging 
of perpetrators’ parental and custody rights, measures 
against harassment and discrimination in the army, the 
introduction of specific training for those working in 
health care, the judiciary and the army and so on. On 
top of that comes the gradual introduction of a public 
guarantee for one-parent families who do not or just 
partially receive maintenance allowance. In the absence 
of maintenance allowance a replacement benefit is paid 
by the family allowance fund after one month. This 
measure is likely to improve the lives of single-parents 
substantially because at present alimony is not paid at all 
or only partially in 40 per cent of cases. Furthermore, the 
Act demands parity in all areas of society: the financial 
penalties that must be paid when parity is not complied 
with have been doubled. Particularly symbolic is the 
fact that 40  per cent of leadership positions in sports 
federations should be occupied by women.
Of particular importance, however, are the measures to 
combat discrimination against women in the workplace. 
On one hand, the principle of a women’s quota for 
executive boards and supervisory boards is extended. 
The 2011 Act provided for a quota of 20  per cent 
for supervisory boards and executive boards of public 
companies, limited companies and limited partnerships 
within three years and of 40  per cent by 2017. This 
had an almost immediate effect: while the proportion 
of women on the boards of CAC402 limited companies 
had risen from 7.4 per cent to 10.5 per cent between 
2006 and 2009, it was already at 15.3 per cent while the 
new law was being debated and by 2012, at 23.5 per 
cent, had already surpassed the target laid down for 
2014, despite the strong opposition of employers. A 
similar development is discernible with regard to the 
SBF120. However, success has been limited. In order 
not to have to comply with the women’s quota certain 
companies transformed themselves into »simplified« 
joint-stock companies (Société par actions simplifiée or 
SAS), which do not have a board. In some instances 
the number of members of executive and supervisory 
boards was adjusted so that additional women did not 
have to be recruited. Finally, women are generally non-
executive board members. Executive members are still 
overwhelmingly male.
The 2014 Act extends the scope of the women’s 
quota. Now it is not only companies with certain forms 
of association that are affected by the 40  per cent 
women’s quota, but all companies with 500 employees 
or over from 2017 and all companies with at least 250 
employees from 2020.3 Penalties have also been stiffened. 
2.  The CAC40 is a French share index that includes the 40 largest 
companies in France by turnover. The SBF120 contains all the firms listed 
in the CAC40, as well as 80 other limited companies listed on the Paris 
Borse.
3.  The Gender Equality Act also provides for the gradual introduction of 
parity in public bodies, such as professional chambers, advisory bodies 
and so on.
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Companies that are sanctioned for discrimination or that 
have failed to enter into negotiations on gender equality 
can be excluded from public contracts and public-private 
partnerships. Two problems remain, however. On one 
hand, the low proportion of women on executive boards; 
on the other hand, the fact that the women’s quota on 
executive and supervisory boards affects only a minority 
of women and does nothing to improve the situation of 
women at work in general. A first step has been taken, 
however, that may facilitate further developments.
But this is also the reason why the Gender Equality Act 
provides for measures to promote women’s employment 
participation and to strengthen their occupational 
status. On one hand, the aim is to increase the extent of 
female employment by doing more to relieve women’s 
burdens in the private sphere and to promote longer 
part-time working. Employees are now to be given the 
option of converting their working-time account into 
»vouchers for services« that can be used in payment 
for household-related services. Also, for child care 
provided by a child minder, families will in future only 
have to make a co-payment (»tiers-payant«), which is 
likely to make it easier for members of lower-income 
families to seek employment. Furthermore, the minimum 
working time was raised to 24 hours a week in the Law 
of 14 June 2014. Based on an average working time of 
23 hours a week with regard to part-time working the 
government is thus aiming at establishing longer part-
time work. This is supposed to help to restrict unwanted 
part-time work. According to Eurostat, in 2013, 45.7 per 
cent of men and 38 per cent of women were in part-time 
employment because they had not been able to find a 
full-time job.
On the other hand, these reforms are also aimed at 
combating occupational discrimination against women 
and boosting women’s presence in male-dominated 
occupations. Thus companies are now obliged to put the 
abolition of gender-related differences in remuneration 
and career development on the agenda of annual 
collective bargaining at enterprise level. Each year 
employers are supposed to produce a report on equal 
opportunities for women and men in the company. 
Furthermore, companies in male-dominated sectors 
are to receive support from sectoral training funds for 
women’s occupational integration. As already mentioned, 
sanctions are to be tightened up in this respect because 
it has become evident that there has been little resort to 
checks and sanctions hitherto. It is revealing in relation 
to this law, which also contains many family-policy 
elements, such as reform of parental leave, that it was 
not set in motion by the Minister of State for the Family, 
but by the Minister for Women’s Rights, Najat Vallaud-
Belcacem.
Nonetheless, reforms aimed at improving gender equality 
were passed that strengthen the situation of women and 
are likely to improve the situation of certain population 
groups, in particular victims of violence and single-parent 
families. However, for a good many years now they have 
been subject to budgetary constraints: only reforms that 
did not cost the state anything were proposed. And as 
before, men remain unaffected by these reforms, so that 
at the level of the division of labour in the family virtually 
nothing is likely to change. Finally, one might ask what 
impact the cutting of family-policy assistance and the 
general raising of taxes might have on the birth rate, 
not only for economic reasons, but also because they 
give the impression that families will not be supported 
to the same extent as previously, thus contributing to 
call France’s credentials as a family-friendly country into 
question.
3.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
Parti Socialiste: Party Conferences, 
Basic Documents, Campaign Positions
  The most recent party conference was held in 
July 2015.
  In early December  2014 a new basic document 
(»charte des valeurs«) with the title »charte des socialistes 
pour le progrès humain« was presented, which does not 
go into detail but is supposed to serve as an ideological 
frame of reference. It contains nothing new. It contains 
nothing new in regard to gender and family policy.
»Project Socialiste 2012«
In this document from 2011, which comes closest to 
a party programme, 30 points are laid down that are 
supposed to represent Socialist priorities in 2012. They 
include:
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  equal pay between women and men;
  opening up of marriage and adoption to same-sex 
couples;
  education and child-rearing:
  reforms in the education system to ensure success 
at school and access to education for children and 
young people, for example, upgrading the teaching 
profession, revision and standardisation of lesson 
plans, adjustment and reduction of lesson times;
  expansion of nursery places and school enrolment 
at the age of two.
  in order to reduce the number of precarious jobs  – 
which primarily affect women – part-time jobs of fewer 
than 20 hours are to be abolished;
  reform of parental leave with the aim of improving 
women’s labour market integration;
  extension of parity to the whole public sphere;
  obligation of all public hospitals to offer abortions;
  contraceptives are to be made available to minors, 
free of charge;
  establishment of a national body to monitor violence 
against women and provision of further training for 
specialist personnel;
  introduction of a prostitution law focusing on 
prevention, sexual health, rehabilitation of former 
prostitutes and criminalisation of clients;
  introduction of lessons at primary school level that 
address gender and gender stereotypes;
  re-introduction of a ministry for women’s rights.
»Les 40 engagements de François Hollande pour 
l’égalité homme-femme« (François Hollande’s 
40 commitments to gender equality)
In the 2012 election campaign François Hollande 
positioned himself as a feminist and presented a paper 
with 40 points concerning how he intends to stand up for 
women’s rights and more equality between women and 
men in society. This draws heavily on »Project Socialiste 
2012«. The points are organised under the following 
issues:
  equality of women and men with regard to 
occupations;
  combating precarity (which affects women much 
more);
  a commitment to lessons that raise awareness of 
sexism and gender stereotypes;
  support for parents and establishment or improvement 
of child care provision for small children;
  strengthening of political parity and more even 
distribution of power in all other social spheres;
  combating gender-specific violence;
  guaranteed access to health services and 
strengthening of sexual rights (information, sex 
education, contraception, abortion);
  reintroduction of a ministry for women’s rights.
3.2 Current Issues and Internal Debates
  In 2013 and 2014 gender and family-policy debates 
seem to have assumed a marginal role within the PS. The 
promises of the election campaign have been dealt with 
one by one, but further programmatic discussions are 
thin on the ground.
  At the summer university in La Rochelle in August 
2014, an annual PS discussion forum, an explicitly 
gender-policy issue was discussed at only one out of the 
50 events, namely the project to introduce lessons on 
awareness of gender and gender stereotyping in primary 
schools.
  It is probable that the currently deep internal divisions 
of the PS, Hollande’s weak position and France’s 
precarious economic situation are playing a role in the 
prioritisation of other issues and the marginalisation of 
gender and family policy issues.
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4.  Germany
4.1  Facts and Figures
  The European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender 
Equality Index for 2012 was 55.3 (out of 100). Although 
this represents an improvement in contrast to previous 
years Germany still lies somewhere in the middle, 
compared with the European average of 52.9.
  The gender pay gap stands at 22 per cent. This level 
has remained surprisingly constant in recent years. More 
recent prognoses, however, show that the introduction 
of the minimum wage can be expected to reduce it.
  The gender pension gap stands at 59.6 per cent. By 
European comparison Germany has one of the largest 
gender pension gaps.
  In 2012, women’s employment rate in the age group 
20–64  years of age stood at 71.5 per cent, compared 
with 82 per cent among men.
  In 2013, 48 per cent of dependently employed women 
worked part-time  – with a maximum working time of 
31 hours a week – compared with a little over 10 per 
cent among men.
  The proportion of women who work fewer 
than 15  hours a week  – that is, in »short part-
time« – is 21 per cent. Thus Germany is currently 
European champion with regard to short part-time 
employment.
  In the low-wage sector, 60 per cent of employees 
are women.
  Even more dire is the difference between mothers and 
fathers, however:
  The employment rates of women and men with 
small children (0–2 years of age) stand at 31.5 per 
cent among women and 82.6  per cent among 
men.
  While 94  per cent of fathers  – between 20 and 
49  years of age with children under 6  years of 
age  – are in full-time employment and only just 
over 6 per cent work part-time, only 68 per cent 
of economically active women are in full-time 
employment.
  At the end of 2014 a mere 5.5 per cent of all members 
of boards of directors in the 160 largest listed German 
companies were women. This represents a fall of 0.7 per 
cent on the previous year. However, in 2005 the figure 
was still only 2.3 per cent.
  The proportion of women in German supervisory 
boards stood at 18.8 per cent at the end of 2014 
and thus has grown continuously since 2010; 
consequently this figure is often brought up in 
discussions about the women’s quota. Female 
supervisory board members are more often 
mandated as employee representatives (25.2  per 
cent).
  From 2016 a women’s quota of at least 30 per cent 
is to apply for the supervisory boards of listed large 
companies, subject to codetermination. Around 
100 companies will be affected by this, while 
another 3,500 must in future lay down binding 
targets to increase the proportion of women in 
executive positions.
  According to estimates, the annual volume of family 
care work in Germany stands at around 4.9 billion hours. 
This corresponds to around 3.2 million jobs and added 
value of around 44  billion euros a year, based on a 
medium wage level. 75 per cent of this unpaid care work 
is performed by women.
  In the event that nursing care becomes necessary 
in a family there is an entitlement to 10 days’ leave 
with wage indemnification for relatives providing 
care. In addition, there is an entitlement to a 
temporary working time reduction.
  During the statutory maternity protection period 
(from 6  weeks before expected childbirth to eight 
weeks or, in the case of multiple or premature births, 
12  weeks thereafter) economically active, statutorily 
insured mothers are entitled to maternity benefit and 
an employer’s allowance before and after childbirth, 
which are borne by the statutory health insurance funds. 
Maternity benefit and allowance are based on net pay 
from the previous three working months and amount to 
a maximum of 13 euros per calendar day. The difference 
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between average net pay for the previous three calendar 
months (converted into calendar days) and maternity 
benefit is made up with the employer’s allowance.
  Parental benefit is paid up to a maximum of 
14 months, two months of which are reserved for one 
parent exclusively. Single parents can receive parental 
benefit for the whole 14 months.
  For those with incomes between 1,000 and 
1,200 euros before the birth of the child income 
replacement is 67 per cent. For net income above 
1,240 euros the replacement rate falls to 65 per 
cent. For parental benefit recipients with net 
incomes below 1,000 euros the replacement rate 
is up to 100 per cent.
  Minimum parental benefit in the amount of 300 
euros can be claimed by all persons who work up 
to 30 hours a week or by categories of persons who 
do not receive an entitlement to parental benefit 
through paid employment, such as students. 
However, parental benefit is calculated on the basis 
of unemployment benefit II, in which case these 
benefit recipients are de facto not entitled.
  Moreover, there is a sibling bonus of 10 per cent 
(but at least 75 euros) for multi-child families with 
small children.
  Parental benefit plus, introduced in 2014, makes it 
possible to link receipt of parental benefit with part-time 
working and, as a consequence, to receive the benefit 
for a longer period (proportionately). It is thus possible 
to receive parental benefit plus for twice as long (up to 
six months).
  If a mother and a father decide to work 
simultaneously for four months between 25 and 
30 hours a week there is an additional partnership 
bonus in the form of four additional parental 
benefit plus months per parent.
  Each parent is entitled to up to three years’ parental 
leave until the child reaches the age of three. During 
this period the employment relationship is suspended, 
although it continues to exist, and the parent is entitled to 
return to the same working time duration as previously.
  With the agreement of the employer up to one year 
of parental leave can be transferred to the period 
between the child’s third and eighth birthdays. 
During parental leave part-time employment of up 
to 30 hours is also permitted.
  In companies with more than 15 employees (unless 
precluded by urgent operational reasons) there is a 
statutory entitlement to a working time reduction 
during parental leave of between 15 and 30 hours.
  Within the framework of the introduction of the 
parental benefit plus regulations parental leave 
was also flexibilised. Thus in future 24 instead of 
12 months can be shifted to the period after the 
child’s third birthday. The employer’s consent is no 
longer required, although for urgent operational 
reasons the employer can refuse at least the third 
portion of parental leave in the period between the 
child’s third and eighth birthdays.
  Child benefit, which is paid for children up to 18 years 
of age (in the case of children still in education, up to 
25 years of age), amounts to 188 euros a month for the 
first and second child, 194 euros for the third child and 
219 euros for the fourth and every subsequent child. 
From 2016 child benefit will be raised by 2 euros.
  For low income families there is a child supplement 
of up to 140 euros (from 1 July 2016 this will increase 
to 160 euros).
  The child supplement – which must be applied for – 
is paid to parents who can cover their own needs, 
but not those of their children. Disbursement is tied 
to a number of conditions, for example, disposable 
income and the child supplement must be required 
to prevent poverty, in accordance with SGB II (Bok 
2 of the Social Code).
  In addition, recipients of the child supplement are 
entitled to benefits in kind for education/training 
and participation, for example, for school trips, 
transport costs for going to school, personal school 
supplies (a total of 100 euros a year) and study 
support.
  In recent years the expansion of care places for children 
under 3 years of age has received a strong boost; since 
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1 August 2013 every child has had a legal right to a care 
place from the age of one.
  In 2014 the care rate  – in other words, the 
proportion of under threes in child day care out of 
all children in this age group – stood at 32.3 per 
cent, an increase of 3  percentage points on the 
previous year.
  From January  2016, in the new federal KitaPlus 
programme (funded to the tune of 100  million 
euros and set to run for three years) day nurseries 
(Kita) that tailor their hours to parents’ needs will 
be supported. This includes opening hours before 
8 am and after 4 pm.
4.2  Current Developments and Debates
In 2015 gender policy in Germany can be described in terms 
of the simultaneous existence of the uncontemporary. 
The equality and family policy reform efforts of recent 
years have been promoted by two societal trends: (i) 
demographic change and (ii) transformation of gender 
role models. The increasing ageing of the German 
population and the ensuing pressure on the labour 
market would suggest stronger labour market integration 
of women also from an economic policy standpoint. At 
the same time, the role models of men and women 
have been changing, accompanied by a growing need 
for more equal distribution of employment and care 
work. Against this background there have been various 
reform efforts in Germany in recent years in the area of 
equality and family policy, aimed at better reconciliation 
of work and family life for women (and men). Part and 
parcel of this process is the gradual dismantling of the 
dominant breadwinner model. However, a number of key 
structurally misdirected incentives remain in place and 
thus there is a need for further reform.
With regard to the shaping of a modern and open 
society, family and gender policy has made great strides 
in Germany in the past 15  years. From 1998 to 2005 
Gerhard Schröder’s Red-Green government, with family 
ministers Christine Bergmann (1998–2002) and Renate 
Schmidt (2002–2005), laid the foundations for this. 
Particularly worthy of mention is the considerable legal 
progress made with regard to same-sex couples. As early 
as 2001 registered partnerships for same-sex couples 
were introduced. Marital rape was also at long last 
made a criminal offence and decisive steps were taken 
towards decriminalising prostitution in order to release 
sex workers from the existing grey area (although this 
remains a matter of controversy among feminists).
With the introduction of the parental benefit in 2007, 
developed by former SPD family minister Renate Schmidt 
and implemented by her conservative successor Ursula 
von der Leyen, young couples were provided with a 
material basis for a division of labour between partners 
after starting a family. On top of that there has been a 
massive expansion in recent years of crèche places for 
children under three years of age (since 2013 there has 
even been a legal entitlement to a crèche place) – both 
were important steps away from the conservative social 
state based on the single breadwinner model towards 
a progressive model along Scandinavian lines. This also 
included a large-scale expansion programme for all-day 
schools.
Parental benefit and nursery school expansion were, on 
one hand, a consequence of the change in gender role 
models and, on the other hand, catalysed further change. 
Now 90 per cent of young couples in Germany take the 
view that both parents are equally responsible for the 
children. At the same time, however, in practice a – partly 
undesired – retraditionalisation of the division of labour 
can be observed among young parents. Mass market 
books such as The Everything’s Possible Lie (Garsoffsky 
and Sembach) and Squaring the Circle: The Myth of the 
Multi-role Parent (Brost and Wefing) are symptoms of the 
growing resignation concerning unresolved issues related 
to the reconciliation of family life and work.
Just how little real equality has become a reality was 
shown in 2011 by the first equality report by the federal 
government. For the first time the current state of equality 
between men and women was assessed systematically. 
The findings were unequivocal: employment and care 
work are distributed extremely unequally between the 
sexes; the decision to have children or the need for care 
of older family members have a tremendous impact 
on the life-course of women, leading to a permanent 
(partial) withdrawal from employment. The resources 
currently made available to support care work are highly 
unsatisfactory and the relevant risks are borne largely by 
the (female) individual, rather than society.
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The equality report shows, in terms of a life-course 
perspective, why in Germany children have a stronger 
influence on women’s careers than in almost any other 
OECD state. Given the low labour market participation of 
(well educated) mothers the equality report came to the 
conclusion that the situation represents a »gross waste 
of resources«. The authors were referring, among other 
things, to the contradictory family and equality policies 
in Germany that create numerous disincentives. For 
example, Germany invests a lot of money in education 
and training for women, but matrimonial »tax splitting« 
and care allowance after childbirth encourage a long 
»baby-break«.
The head of the commission that produced the first 
equality report, Professor Ute Klammer, came to the 
conclusion that the (then) family, equality and labour 
market policies resembled a »building site with signposts 
pointing in different directions«. To guide future legislation 
the commission proposed, on Scandinavian lines, the 
dual breadwinner model to enable men and women to 
carry out both paid work and care work during the life-
course. In May 2015 a second expert commission was 
established, tasked with working out concrete proposals 
on the implementation of selected recommendations 
from the first report by the end of 2016.
Furthermore, 25 years after German reunification it can 
be said that Germany remains a »divided country« in 
terms of family and gender policy. East/west differences 
have not been resolved: family structures, women’s 
employment patterns and gender role models differ 
substantially in the two parts of the country. While in 
western Germany the one and a half or one and a quarter 
breadwinner model dominates, in eastern Germany 
women’s propensity to seek employment is much higher. 
In 2010 only 27 per cent of children in western Germany 
were born in relationships without a marriage certificate, 
as against 61 per cent in eastern Germany.
Generally speaking, all the political parties represented 
in the German parliament  – admittedly to different 
degrees  – have modernised their gender and family 
policy approaches in the past 10–20 years. By contrast, 
in 2014 a decidedly conservative party was founded – the 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – which has experienced 
a particularly warm reception in, of all places, equality-
oriented eastern Germany. Originally established as an 
anti-euro party, the AfD entered the European Parliament 
in 2014. It then did well in the state elections in the 
eastern German Länder of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and 
Brandenburg with an extended palette of so-called 
»Wutbürger-Themen« (»angry citizen issues«), rearing 
up against Islam, gender and »egalitarianism« (in a 
pejorative sense), not to mention the legal equality of 
same-sex couples. AfD officials also play a role in the 
context of various right-wing/conservative movements. 
Thus the Civil Coalition (Zivile Koalition e. V.), founded 
by AfD MEP Beatrix von Storch, together with other self-
styled »protectors of life«, participated in the organisation 
of a Europe-wide citizens’ petition against abortion 
rights; the AfD is also a driving force in demonstrations 
against the progressive education plans of various SPD-
Green Land governments. Furthermore, there are clear 
links and overlaps with the xenophobic movement 
Pegida (»Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung 
des Abendlandes«  – Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamisation of the West). In a position paper published 
by the initiative on 10 December  2014 we find the 
following statement: »Pegida is against this crazy gender 
mainstreaming, also often known as genderisation, the 
already almost compulsory, politically correct gender 
neutralisation of our language!«
Gender bashing is not confined to the AfD, however. 
The terms »gender« and »gender mainstreaming« have 
generally become negative buzzwords for conservative 
rightwingers and right-wing populists; indeed they 
are now commonplace. Under the newly coined word 
»genderism« gender studies, gender mainstreaming, 
women’s quotas and also the legal equality of same-sex 
couples and education plans that aim at promulgating 
acceptance of diversity are stigmatised as dangerous, 
anti-democratic policies, a state-decreed and -funded re-
education programme and a waste of taxpayers’ money. 
There is no shortage of crude conspiracy theories either. 
The gender debate is increasingly a matter of identity and 
a hallmark issue.
At the same time, gender policy and modern family 
policy have increasingly become concerns of progressive 
men in politics, the trade unions, associations and 
the media. For example, in 2010 Forum Männer, a 
Germany-wide group that focuses on men’s issues, 
was founded – as counterpart to the German Women’s 
Council – with the aim of »promoting gender equality 
and gender democracy, in particular with regard to the 
life circumstances of boys, men and fathers«.
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The feminist movement has also received a powerful 
boost in recent years, especially on the internet. Web 
2.0 has enabled feminist activists to network and many 
feminist blogs have sprung up. A provisional highpoint of 
the internet feminist movement was a campaign against 
sexism launched in 2013: under the hashtag #Aufschrei 
(Outcry) internet feminists tweeted their experiences with 
sexism and thus triggered a big social debate. Within the 
framework of this debate political and media interest 
in feminist issues, feminist »leaders« and the research 
results of gender studies has grown. The greater the 
interest and the stronger the presence of gender issues 
in the media the more aggressively the anti-feminist 
»defenders of men’s rights« have become. Although 
few in number they have become so well organised 
that they are able, through their massive and aggressive 
presence in online forums, to poison every debate on 
equality policy. Initially, the fact that more and more 
individuals (women, migrants and so on) are falling victim 
to violent communication on the internet (»shitstorm«) 
was scarcely regarded as a political issue. Now, however, 
awareness of the problem is increasing. For example, the 
Länder Conference of Equality and Women’s Ministers 
and Senators (Konferenz der Gleichstellungs- und 
Frauenministerinnen und -minister, -senatorinnen und 
-senatoren der Länder, GFMK) has taken up the issue of 
cyber-violence against women.
Since the end of 2013 a Grand Coalition of the SPD and 
the CDU has governed Germany, with the former as the 
junior partner. However, the SPD does head key ministries 
relevant to gender and family policy. Besides the federal 
Ministry of Family Affairs, Seniors, Women and Young 
People (Manuela Schwesig) the party also heads the 
Ministry of Labour (Andrea Nahles), the Ministry of Justice 
(Heiko Maas) and the Ministry of the Economy (Sigmar 
Gabriel). The fact that the SPD has taken such a resolute 
grip on the family and equality ministry shows that it has 
learned a lesson: in the Grand Coalition of 2005–2009 
Christian Democrat Ursula von der Leyen was the family 
minister and made her mark with progressive family 
policy reforms (introduction of parental benefit with 
partner months). Meanwhile, the SPD lost considerable 
prestige and its reputation for competence suffered with 
regard to family policy, losing women’s votes as a result. 
This reputation for competence has now been restored; 
the SPD has set out to win back its reputation as the party 
of the family and equality. While her CDU predecessor 
Kristina Schröder expressly distanced herself from 
feminism, Manuela Schwesig has always emphasised her 
function as equality minister.
The coalition pact of the CDU-SPD government contains 
important and path-breaking family and gender policy 
agreements, along the lines of the dual-breadwinner 
model mentioned above. This includes the introduction of 
a women’s quota for supervisory boards, parental benefit 
plus, reconciliation of work and family life, the minimum 
wage and the right to limited part-time working (right 
of return from part-time to full-time). The coalition pact 
represents progress in comparison with the marginal role 
played by (working) time policy in the 2013 parliamentary 
election campaign and the years preceding it. On one 
hand, key ideas such as »time policy« and »partnership« 
have been incorporated. On the other hand, parental 
benefit plus represents a tangible instrument at the 
interface between labour, family and equality policy. Here 
the reality of changing gender roles and what parents 
want with regard to working time have been taken into 
account, at least to some extent.
At the same time, however, the SPD was unable to get 
the care allowance – 100 euros a month for parents who 
have not claimed a day care place for their small children, 
introduced by the Christian-Liberal coalition at the last 
moment in 2014 – rescinded by the coalition pact. The 
care allowance was denounced almost unanimously as a 
retrograde step in terms of education and equality policy 
by the business sector, the trade unions, academia and 
many civil society actors. The majority of the democratic 
party spectrum was also against its introduction, 
including parts of the CDU/CSU and the FDP. Only the 
Bavarian sister party of the CDU, the CSU, insisted on 
the care allowance, carrying it through as a prestige and 
showcase policy. In July  2015 the care allowance was 
declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional 
Court and is thus, at least in most Länder, now history 
(or will be shortly).
The negotiating partners were similarly unable to reach 
agreement on the legal equality of same-sex couples. 
The SPD demanded the right for same-sex couples to get 
married, as well as full adoption rights; the CDU/CSU did 
not go along with it, however – possibly so as not to lose 
a key conservative »unique selling point«.
More than one and a half years after the new federal 
government took office almost all of the abovementioned 
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gender and family policy measures contained in the 
coalition agreement have been implemented. First 
in line was parental benefit reform. It aims at more 
partnership in the division of paid employment and 
care work between fathers and mothers, by creating 
incentives with parental benefit plus for the combination 
of parental benefit and part-time working  – for both 
genders. Family minister Manuela Schwesig declared 
that parental benefit plus would be the first step in 
the direction of family working time, targeted financial 
support of parents with small children who both decide 
to work »short full-time« (for example, 32 hours a week) 
in order to divide paid employment and care work on 
a partnership basis. Since January  2014 the Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Young People (BMFSFJ) has intensified the discussion on 
family working time as a new instrument of family and 
equality policy. It contains a strong partnership element: 
wage replacement is to be provided only if both partners 
reach agreement on the as yet to be determined working 
time of, for example, 32 hours a week. Crucial to the 
proposal was the recognition that fathers are the key to 
a fairer distribution of paid employment and family work 
between the sexes. Only if they reduce their working time 
and take on more care work is it possible for mothers to 
step up their working time. The proposal, also supported 
by labour minister Andrea Nahles, means abandoning an 
idea that long served as point of reference for the Social 
Democrats, namely the ideal of dual full-time work for 
parents. There was support for such a model from the 
trade unions – including Europe’s largest industrial trade 
union IG Metall – social and family associations and many 
feminists. This is an indication of the changing time policy 
discussion in Germany, in which increasingly women, 
but also men are calling for better and partnership based 
reconciliation of family and work. Given this prioritisation, 
however, another, equally important equality policy 
concern has become lost from view: the older demand 
for a gradual extension of exclusive partner months (at 
present two months), for example, in the direction of the 
Icelandic model. Up to a few years ago this envisaged 
three months exclusively for the mother, three for the 
father and three to be divided up as the couple saw fit. 
This division of parental benefit months meant that more 
than 95  per cent of fathers claimed parental benefit. 
However, only around 20 per cent of fathers claimed part 
of the freely divisible months. In order to further equalise 
the division of parental time between the sexes a reform 
of the parental months regulation was implemented in 
recent years. The total number of months was increased 
to 12, with five months reserved for each parent.
Substantially more controversial than parental benefit 
plus was the debate on the introduction of a women’s 
quota for supervisory boards, even though it was agreed 
in the coalition pact. There was considerable resistance 
in the business sector, sometimes even from the coalition 
partner itself, especially from the ranks of the CSU. 
Implementation of the quota was boosted by preceding 
events, in particular the fact that in the years 2011–
2013 a cross-party alliance had formed in favour of the 
quota. In the so-called Berlin Declaration women from 
almost all parties, representatives of associations, actors, 
trade unionists, business people, academics and many 
others demanded the introduction of a women’s quota 
for supervisory boards. The discussion also received a 
boost in Germany from a European Commission initiative 
proposing a 40 per cent quota for women in supervisory 
boards. However, the Council of Ministers has put this 
proposal on ice for the time being. Also significant for 
the success of the proposal was the fact that not only 
women from the centre-left spectrum advocated the 
quota, but also representatives from the conservative 
camp, in other words, the CDU and the FDP. Many men 
signed the declaration, too. This broad alliance made 
it easier for the SPD to push through the quota in the 
coalition negotiations and later on to implement it, when 
it came to getting the relevant law passed and the wind 
was blowing more strongly in the opposite direction. This 
has now proved possible: from 2016 onwards 30  per 
cent of the members of the supervisory boards of listed 
companies must be women (to date, it has been a little 
over 18 per cent). Around 100 listed companies subject 
to codetermination will be affected by this and a further 
3,500 will in future have to set binding targets to increase 
the share of women in executive positions. However, to 
date, implementation seems to have been fitful; many 
companies appear to have failed to set proper targets or 
to develop implementation plans.
With regard to the reconciliation of care work and paid 
employment a number of important aspects of the 
coalition pact have been implemented. On one hand, 
in the event a family has to provide care a ten-day break 
from work with wage replacement was introduced. 
On the other hand, the inadequate law on family care 
time from the period in which Kristina Schröder was 
family minister was improved. The law was supposed to 
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enable a temporary working time reduction for relatives 
providing care, but there was no legal entitlement – this 
shortcoming has now been remedied in accordance with 
the coalition pact.
Another equality policy milestone is the statutory 
minimum wage of 8.50 euros an hour pushed by labour 
minister Andrea Nahles and adopted by the Bundestag 
in 2014. Although at first glance this is gender neutral, 
it does have a gender policy effect because more than 
six out of ten employees in the low wage sector are 
women. Accordingly, the first estimates indicate that the 
introduction of the minimum wage will also have positive 
effects on the gender pay gap in Germany.
Also on the federal government’s to-do list is a law 
against unequal pay for men and women, the so-called 
equal pay law. The gender pay gap in Germany, at 22 per 
cent, is quite high by OECD comparison, and has barely 
diminished in the past 20  years. Several gender-spe-
cific inequalities come together in the gender pay gap, 
including women’s longer employment breaks due to 
pregnancy and child care, the fact that they often work 
in poorly paid jobs and are to be found less often in 
executive positions. Part of the gender pay gap – up to a 
third – cannot be explained this way, however, and is of-
ten linked to pure wage discrimination based on gender.
The logical consequence of the gender pay gap is the 
gender pension gap, which in Germany is almost 60 per 
cent, very high by European comparison. This means in 
concrete terms that women in old age have only just over 
40 per cent of the income of men, on average. According 
to a recent study by the European Institute for Gender 
Equality, Germany – together with Luxembourg – leads 
the field in Europe in this regard. Old age poverty, 
in particular among women from the babyboomer 
generation  – the largest birth cohort in the Federal 
Republic – will rise constantly in the coming years. Many 
political actors are still turning a blind eye to the problem, 
however, since its effects will only emerge in the future. 
Many women – and thus female voters – are increasingly 
becoming aware of this ticking timebomb, however. Thus 
according to one survey only just over a quarter of the 
women questioned thought that their old age insurance 
would suffice to maintain their living standards in the 
event of separation from their partners. And 51 per cent 
of women – but also 44 per cent of men – are generally 
worried about provisions for their old age.
A German »speciality« that also contributes to the 
extent of the gender pay and gender pension gaps is 
the extremely high proportion of part-time employment 
among women. Although female employment has risen 
above 70 per cent in recent years, in less than half the 
cases is it full-time. The Social Democratic labour minister 
Andrea Nahles thus wants, over the long term, to create 
a right to restricted part-time work (in other words, a 
right to return to previous weekly working time). The 
introduction of such a legal entitlement would be a 
gender policy milestone for two reasons: first, for many 
women part-time employment without a legal right of 
return to their original working time has proved to be 
a career trap; second, the lack of a right to return to 
full-time working is a major obstacle preventing many 
men from reducing their working time for the sake of 
the family. The decisive question is now whether the 
CDU/CSU will keep its word and the agreement in the 
coalition pact or cave in to the expected resistance from 
the employers’ organisations.
Another issue relevant to equality and family policy 
and high on the federal government’s agenda is child 
care. This concerns in particular the extension of hours 
of care (KitaPlus programme) and the quality of care 
(for example, staff ratios). In Germany the Länder are 
responsible for child care, which means that the quality 
of day nurseries varies from Land to Land. However, the 
Länder have so far resisted a law on quality control. There 
has been progress nevertheless: the federal government 
has amended the day nursery expansion law and the 
municipalities can now spend money received from 
central government on equipping day nurseries, not only 
on construction measures. Furthermore, in 2017/2018 
federal participation in child care running costs will be 
increased. In addition, a timetable has been agreed 
with regard to uniform day nursery quality and regular 
exchange of information between the family ministry 
and Länder, municipalities, providers, trade unions and 
parents’ representatives on structural and quality issues.
4.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
Overall, Social Democrats have become keenly aware 
that gender and family policy issues are important and 
that here in particular it is both necessary and possible 
to stand out from the (party) political competition. At 
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the Bundestag elections in 2009 the SPD lost 21  per 
cent of the votes of young women (18–24 years of age) 
compared with the previous elections. An even worse 
decline was registered among women 35–45  years of 
age, only 14.6  per cent of whom voted SPD in 2009, 
falling to 11.6 per cent in 2013. The women in the »rush-
hour of life«  – in the period of life between 30 and 
45 years of age, in which many challenges with regard to 
career and family planning tend to congregate – clearly 
did not regard the SPD as representing them. These days 
even prominent political advisors are recommending 
that more emphasis be put on family policy issues (for 
example, child care, reconciliation of work and family life, 
employment and care work). Because surveys have shown 
that the SPD is perceived by many voters  – male and 
female – as very »masculine« a discussion is now going 
on about how the party can become more »feminine«.
Currently, family and equality policy issues are playing an 
important role in various discussion contexts in the SPD, 
among other things in the »Themenlaboren« (issue labs) 
of the party executive, but also within the framework 
of the SPD parliamentary party’s New Justice project. 
The discussion process in the SPD on gender and family 
policy priorities and the relevant terminology has not 
yet been concluded. Furthermore, there are still points 
of uncertainty and open questions with regard to the 
formulation of the party’s family and equality policy 
positions. Because of the current gender bashing there 
is considerable perplexity concerning how it might be 
possible to present a clearly progressive gender policy 
standpoint, without being caught in the crossfire. Whether 
the notion of »gender« can become the instrument of 
choice is doubtful, in particular because many (men) 
automatically equate it with »the advancement of 
women« and assume that it has nothing to do with 
them. At the same time, given the constant crises and 
turbulence in Europe, gender issues are running the 
gauntlet of charges of irrelevancy. There is still no clear 
line that takes gender and family policy issues as part of 
a more comprehensive strategy for prosperity, growth 
and quality of life.
In the Bundestag election campaign of 2013 the CDU/
CSU was able to present itself as the party of freedom 
of choice and the Social Democrats as the party of 
paternalism. The CDU/CSU set the notion of »freedom 
of choice« above all against what was originally a 
social democratic model that since Renate Schmidt was 
family minister has prioritised the expansion of child 
care, including legal entitlements – in other words, the 
reconciliation of family life and work. The deployment of 
the term »freedom of choice« portrayed the left as dour 
dogmatists. Social Democrats now face the challenge 
of positioning themselves as representatives of a 
progressive family and gender policy, without rhetorically 
undervaluing lifestyles that do not correspond to this 
image and without »imposing« »reconciliation« as yet 
another unreasonable addition to the stress of everyday 
life. The SPD is now seeking answers to the question of 
how it can really facilitate reconciliation and partnership, 
by means of smart policy instruments (life course options) 
and the necessary infrastructure. This involves discovering 
what really makes an attractive gender and family policy.
The oldest bone of contention with regard to family and 
equality policy in Germany is so-called »marital splitting«, 
which gives married couples a tax incentive to pursue 
an asymmetrical division of labour (sole earner couples 
or the one and a half earners model). At the moment, 
however, it seems difficult to mobilise a political and even 
a social majority to abolish marital splitting, although 
academia, business and feminists are in agreement that 
it should be abolished (on this see also the results of the 
overall evaluation commissioned by the family ministry of 
marriage and family-related benefits in 2014). The fear is 
that the voters would not appreciate such a reform plan: 
to date, the public has not seen it as an emancipatory 
plan, but rather as an assault on their own way of life 
or as a hidden tax increase for families. At the same 
time, however, there is a lively debate on how unfair 
it is that couples benefit from state support through 
marital splitting, but not unmarried families with children 
or single parents. A keynote motion debated briefly 
by the SPD national executive, prepared for the party 
conference in December, concerns, among other things, 
the possibility of converting marital splitting into a social 
democratic family splitting (with protection for existing 
marriages), thereby taking into account the increased 
variety of family forms and linking support more closely 
to the presence of children.
A fresh appraisal is now under way within the centre-left 
spectrum of how family benefits and services can be made 
fairer, in particular because the dual system comprising 
child benefit and child tax allowances currently favours 
high income families. However, some success has been 
achieved with regard to single parents: family minister 
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Manuela Schwesig defended the increase in tax relief 
against finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who initially 
wanted to block it. However, the issue of support for 
single parents remains work in progress, because single 
parents – and thus also their children – remain exposed 
to an enormous risk of poverty in Germany.
At the same time, the unspoken question concerns 
how positive incentives can be applied to get men and 
women to distribute paid employment and care work on 
a partnership basis. The proposed family working time 
(see above) is currently the focus of this rethink because it 
has proved to be particularly capable of attracting broad-
based support and finds a hearing even in segments of 
the conservative party spectrum.
A paradigm change has also been discernible in the media 
debate on working time. For a long time the standard of 
full-time working for men went unchallenged and work–
family life reconciliation was treated only as a »women’s 
issue«, but suddenly the focus shifted to problems of 
work-life balance and what fathers wanted in terms 
of working time. In summer/autumn 2014 the media 
also discovered the issue of »time policy«. For example, 
Elisabeth Neijahr and Marc Brost wrote in Die Zeit: »For 
the first time in 30 years Germans want different working 
times and it has become a mass movement once again«. 
But other big media outlets – among others Der Spiegel 
and Wirtschaftswoche  – have also taken up the issue 
of working time. The issue has also become embedded 
in the demography debate, as well as in the debate 
on skills shortages, which already exist in some sectors 
(especially social and health care services) and loom in 
others. Overall, the issue of »time pressure« has come 
to the fore and is widely discussed. There is also broad 
awareness of, among other things, statistics produced 
by health insurance organisations on the issue of the 
everyday burdens on families and the ensuing health 
risks. Time pressure, according to the diagnosis, not 
only impedes equality between men and women, but 
also jeopardises the health of parents, the institution of 
the family and thus also child welfare. On top of that, 
numerous studies based on representative surveys show 
that the issue of »time pressure« and its associated 
reconciliation problems is of key importance for many 
parents.
Other debates are linked to the discussion on family 
working time, in particular the issue of what a new 
full-time standard in the life course might look like that 
also took into account people with care responsibilities. 
Also still to be answered is the question of how small 
and medium sized enterprises could be helped to make 
it easier for their employees to exercise working time 
sovereignty and what the division of labour could be 
between legislators, the social partners and business. The 
issue of working time is also under renewed discussion in 
the trade unions. Among other things, IG Metall recently 
declared that the issue of (self-determined) working 
time will be a central focus of its trade union activities 
in the coming years. There is every chance of forming 
majorities in the centre-left spectrum for family working 
time because the Greens and The Left are also looking 
at how »short full-time working« for parents and in the 
life course could be better promoted. The Greens are 
also debating a version of family time, although they 
are seeking to extend receipt of parental benefit to 
24 months, of which eight months would be reserved 
exclusively for each parent. However, such an extension 
is likely to be very expensive.
The biggest gender policy challenge in the coming years 
is, at first glance, not a gender policy challenge: the future 
of old people’s care. However, the German care system 
remains based largely on the unpaid labour of women, 
who often have to take long periods out of employment 
to care for relatives or even never return to the labour 
market. Because the number of people in need of care will 
increase considerably in the coming years more and more 
women – actively employed until that time – would have 
to assume care duties. At the same time, professional 
care is typically a female occupation: badly paid, without 
further development options and subject to considerable 
intensification as a result of »rationalisation« it is a so-
called dead-end job at major risk of old age poverty. 
It is the task of left-wing equality and family policy to 
come up with possible ways out of this that also take 
into account the dignity of those who need to be cared 
for. This involves flexible time budgets to improve the 
reconciliation of work and family life, good municipal 
infrastructure and financial upgrading of social service 
jobs. The SPD has recognised the importance of the issue 
in family and equality policy terms and is working on 
solutions at various levels. The struggle concerning how 
the issues are interpreted has yet to be won, however. 
This applies to models for reconciling work and family 
life, as well as »family working time«: in other words, 
the issue is not (further) expensive, inefficient transfer 
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payments, but social investment, which in the medium 
term will pay dividends for both the individual and the 
national economy and social protection systems. Closely 
tied to this issue are »social services for modern families«: 
what social services are needed by families with children 
or relatives in need of care? How can we make such 
services available to all families, not just to families with 
high incomes (for example, the Belgian voucher system is 
under discussion)? How can the gender policy advances 
of well educated women be realised without poorly 
educated women paying the price? In other words, how 
can decent jobs be created out of the growing need for 
social services? How can a(nother) division of the labour 
market into well paid, well insured »male« industrial 
jobs and badly paid »female« service jobs be prevented? 
How can we upgrade »female« jobs? Professor of home 
economics Uta Meier-Gräwe said in the Frankfurter 
Rundschau: »Whether the expansion of the service sector 
is accompanied by the development of good service 
sector employment or whether we remain on the well 
trodden path of a cheap services economy is ultimately a 
political decision«. Social Democrats have yet to take this 
fundamental decision for themselves.
Another gender policy issue is still in its infancy and has 
been little researched to date, namely the effects of 
digitalisation of the world of work on gender relations. 
The Ministry of Labour has launched a debate within the 
framework of the dialogue »Work 4.0« and the expert 
committee working on the federal government’s second 
equality report is also dealing with the issue. This includes, 
for example, the question of how »reconciliation gains« 
can be realised from enhanced opportunities for mobile 
working.
Last but not least there is the question of what a modern 
model of the family might look like: according to the 
Social Democrats »for us a family is wherever people 
take responsibility for one another«. The task now is 
to update and specify this model. The family landscape 
is constantly changing: almost 30  per cent of children 
in western Germany are now born in non-marital 
situations, while in eastern Germany the figure is 60 per 
cent. At the same time, the number of so-called rainbow 
and patchwork families is increasing; new family-like 
communities are also forming, such as so-called »senior 
living communities« (Senioren-WGs). Given the rapid 
change, Social Democrats, but also the Greens, have 
already begun to examine how »new communities of 
responsibility« can be better supported, safeguarded and 
recognised.
On a positive note, family and equality policy issues 
are now a focus of concern for Social Democrats. In 
particular under the label »politics for the rushed 
[gehetzte] generation« leading politicians have recently 
been putting work–life reconciliation issues on the 
agenda – and not only as marginal issues, but as central 
challenges for a modern society. The challenge is to get 
people on board with progressive gender and family 
policies once again.
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5.  Hungary
5.1  Facts and Figures
  The European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender 
Equality Index for 2012 was 41.6 (out of 100). Although 
this represents an improvement in contrast to the first 
measurement in 2005 Hungary still scores below the 
European average of 52.9 and the score slightly decreased 
compared to 2010 (42.0).
  Female employment rate: 55.9  per cent (male rate: 
67.8 per cent), which marks one of the lowest female 
employment rates in the EU.
  Low part-time rate among women (slight increase 
due to the crisis): 8.7  per cent (overall part-time rate: 
6.4 per cent).
  The gender pay gap stands at 20.1 per cent (with an 
increasing trend: in 2006 it was 14.4 per cent).
  A maternity leave of six months’ (24  weeks) with 
70 per cent earnings replacement (without cap).
  Also, there is an entitlement to a two-year parental 
leave (70  per cent earnings replacement, capped) 
for mothers or fathers who had been employed for 
at least 365 days during the two years prior to birth 
(gyermekgondozási díj or GYED [child-care benefit]).
  For a third year, as well as for those not previously in 
employment there is a low universal benefit (around 90 
euros, not raised since 2008) (gyermekggondozási segély 
GYES [child care assistance].
  Since January 2014 it has been possible to combine 
GYED with employment after the child’s first birthday 
which was not possible before; from 2015 this is possible 
from the age of six months on.
  Protection against dismissal applies during parental 
leave. However, this has been modified: previously, it 
applied up to the child’s third birthday (even if  – as is 
usual – the mother returned to work earlier). According 
to the new Labour Code protection applies only to the 
period of parental leave; dismissal protection no longer 
applies from the day the mother returns to work.
  Parental leave can be taken by either parent, 
however, because of the predominant conservative role 
expectations and the income gap between men and 
women very few men take parental leave.
  At present, there are day nursery places for 16  per 
cent of children under the age of 3 (though the trend is 
upwards).
  Only 10 per cent of MPs are women.
5.2  Current Developments and Debates
In recent years government rhetoric on family policy has 
undergone several transformations. The period of office 
of Gordon Bajnai (2009–2010), who was appointed by the 
Socialist Party (MSZP), but was himself an independent, 
was characterised mainly by »austerity« policy. The issue 
of »crisis management« dominated the public debate, 
also in the area of family policy. During his term of office 
certain universal benefits were frozen (and have not been 
raised since then). Within the framework of the cuts and 
in an effort to speed up mothers’ return to the labour 
market, Bajnai’s »crisis cabinet« cut, among other things, 
parental leave from three to two years. The long parental 
leave is very appreciated by Hungarians and thus the 
curtailment was extremely unpopular. To make matters 
worse, this measure was not accompanied by increased 
state provision for children under three years of age, 
with the result that it would have boosted poverty rather 
than female employment. One of the first measures 
implemented by the Fidesz/KDNP government in 2010 
was the symbolic restoration of three-year parental leave.
Although »austerity« policy was high on the 
government’s agenda due to the EU deficit procedure, 
which ended only in 2013, it vanished from the repertoire 
of justifications for cuts in family benefits when Viktor 
Orbán came to power in 2010. Instead, selective family 
policy cuts were from now on sold as conservative 
measures »in accordance with nature« and expressed 
a preference for certain strata of society. For example, 
the lack of investment in child care infrastructure and 
the failure to raise universal family benefits, while at 
the same time families with higher incomes received an 
increased tax relief, was justified on the grounds that 
the majority of middle-class families, which in any case it 
was government policy to support, would prefer to look 
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after their children at home. According to a government 
programme, increasing the tax relief aimed at boosting 
the fertility of the middle class.
Whereas in the period from 2010–2014 family policy in 
Hungary had been rather conservative in orientation, at 
present a progressive transformation is under way, in 
terms of both discourse and political action.
In 2014 the national-conservative alliance between Fidesz 
and its small coalition partner KNDP (Kereszténydemokrata 
Néppárt – Christian Democratic People’s Party) was re-
elected in Hungary, with Viktor Orbán as prime minister 
once again. Between 2010 and 2014 and from 2014 
until the composition of parliament changed early in 
2015 he governed with a two-thirds majority, which is 
enough to make changes to the constitution. He used 
this option extensively, also with regard to family policy 
issues (see below). As already mentioned, at the 2014 
parliamentary elections the ruling parties won a two-
thirds majority, but in the meantime this has been lost 
due to a by-election won by an independent candidate 
in February 2015.
At the 2014 elections the progressive opposition alliance 
comprised the MSZP (Socialist Party), the DK (Democratic 
Coalition), the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP) and the 
electoral coalition Együtt-PM (made up of a liberal 
splinter party and a spin-off from the Greens, which has 
since been dissolved). The right-wing extremist Jobbik 
(literally, the »Rights«) improved its share of the votes 
from 16 to 20 per cent. The Green Party (LMP) was the 
only one to make a conspicuous issue of gender equality 
in the election campaign (LMP is still seen as pioneers; 
only recently they have put the situation of single parents 
on the agenda for the first time in Hungarian politics); it 
just managed to surmount the 5 per cent threshold and 
now has five MPs (out of 199). Only 20 of the 199 MPs 
are women, which means that Hungary has the lowest 
proportion of women MPs in the EU.
Family policy in 2010–2014 initially adhered closely to the 
right-wing conservative orientation of the government 
coalition. The most substantial conservative move in the 
period from 2010–2014 was a change in the constitution 
2012, which provides that Hungary shall »protect the 
institution of marriage« as a »union of man and wife« 
and as »the basis for the survival of the nation«. This 
definition excludes marriage between same-sex partners 
and besides that discriminates against unmarried couples 
with children with regard to social rights and inheritance 
issues. The government had already tried to embed the 
new definition in family law tout court, but that was 
rejected as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
The government circumvented the latter’s ruling by 
changing the constitution.
In the debate on the family law reform in 2012 the 
opposition Green Party, the LMP, tried to get one month 
out of the 36 months of parental leave set aside solely 
for fathers (or the other parent), but in vain. The main 
counter-argument was that this would represent too great 
an interference in private family affairs. Nevertheless, 
the five days of paid paternity leave remained in place. 
Although studies show that there is a connection 
between engaged fathers and the birth of a second or 
third child, an exclusive parental leave month for fathers 
is no longer publically discussed. Though recently the 
party Együtt tried to place the topic on the agenda of 
family policy, it was quickly set aside by the government 
parties.
Nevertheless, a progressive turn can be observed. A 
new subcommittee has recently been established within 
the Cultural Committee of the Parliament which is 
committed to »the dignity of the women« and has a 
progressive agenda for the coming months. It remains 
to be seen what will be decided and prepared there. The 
shortages in nursery care are on the agenda. Also, there 
are initiatives to support the reintegration of women into 
the labour market. Since January 2014 it is, for example, 
possible to combine child-care benefit (GYED) with 
employment after the child’s first birthday; from 2015 
on this is possible from the age of six months. It remains 
characteristic though that the measures target the 
better-off and that they are embedded in a demographic 
discourse.
Yet  – this discourse has undergone a reinterpretation. 
There is a growing awareness that higher birth rates 
among the middle class can only be achieved by means 
of improvements in the reconciliation of work and family 
life, not by attempts to push a conservative model of the 
family. Massive expansion of day nursery care is thus in 
prospect. Closely connected to this stance is the concern 
about women’s low labour market participation, which 
the governing parties share with the opposition parties. 
Expanding part-time work for women is regarded in 
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all quarters as the key to higher employment rates, by 
facilitating reconciliation of work and family life. This 
consensus is based on the fact that all parties, from left 
to right, are united by the conviction that child care and 
the household are overwhelmingly a woman’s domain. 
However, the left-wing parties at least point out that 
part-time work is usually paid very low and thus cannot 
represent a permanent solution for families.
By and large, however, the family and gender policy debate 
and corresponding government measures are dominated 
by demographic change or the »demographic crisis«. 
Emotive slogans such as the »death of the nation« are 
combined with »family values«. The government hailed 
the rise in the birth rate from 1.25 children per mother in 
2011 to 1.41 in 2014 as a success of its policies.
The opposition parties barely challenge this discourse. In 
2013 the five parliamentary parties announced that there 
was consensus on the fact that the government must do 
everything it can to enable people to have the children 
they want. Recently this joint declaration was reaffirmed. 
Then opposition politician Gordon Bajnai, who has left 
politics following the 2014 election campaign, spoke 
of women almost exclusively in terms of demographic 
challenges and even in the socialist MSZP’s campaigning 
women were in evidence only as mothers (and as 
candidates mainly in last place on party lists, without 
a hope of winning). Thus the demographic discourse 
remains dominant – few feminist actors and journalists 
raise their voices against it. It remains a challenge how 
to turn this consensus (which can only be found rarely in 
Hungarian politics and is therefore appreciated) to policy 
measures which at the same time contribute to gender 
equality.
Interestingly, one of the few vociferous and successful 
civil movements in Hungary concerned a »women’s 
issue«, namely combating violence against women. In 
2012 a citizens’ initiative called for a law to combat 
violence in families, gathering over 100,000 signatures. 
During the parliamentary debate a Christian Democrat 
MP unleashed an unprecedented wave of indignation by 
declaring: »Women should only talk about self-fulfilment 
when they’ve had three or four children; then there’d be 
more respect in the family and less reason for violence.« 
This triggered spontaneous demonstrations throughout 
the country, involving men and women, progressives 
and conservatives alike. A heated media discussion 
ensued, the upshot of which was that the government 
coalition changed its previously hostile attitude towards 
the citizens’ initiative’s demand for a law on violence 
against women. In fact, a new law was included in the 
Penal Code which, among other things, allows the police 
to intervene  – until then violence against women (in 
the sense of domestic violence) was regarded a purely 
private matter. The law came into force in July  2013, 
although not with the formulation »family violence«, 
which had previously been common in the public debate. 
In order not to »besmirch« the notion of »family« the 
term »violence in relationships« was used instead. 
Regardless of the terminology, a genuine paradigm 
change took place here and the issue of violence in the 
family ceased to be taboo. A series of scandals  – for 
example, concerning an MP who had brutally beaten 
his wife – has in the meantime ensured that the issue of 
»violence against women« remains on the agenda. In 
March  2014 Hungary signed the Istanbul Convention, 
the Convention on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence by the Council of 
Europe. The progressive parties and feminist actors urge 
for its immediate ratification; the government ensures 
that it is in preparation.
5.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
Since the election, the socialist party MSZP has been 
engaged in a profound process of self-reflection about 
ways to become politically significant again in the coming 
years and beyond. It may be that this ongoing debate 
on strategic reorientation will provide an opportunity for 
the party to reposition itself on gender and family policy 
issues.
There certainly are opportunities to forge alliances. For 
example, in response to an appeal made by a hospital 
nurse, social care professionals have been mobilised. In 
May 2015 they demonstrated against their high workload 
and low income. Many emigrate or switch professions 
and a skills shortage is looming. The demonstrators are 
calling for fair wages and better working conditions, also 
because through this, recruitment to social professions 
would be improved.
Furthermore, the initiative »The City is for All« proves to 
be interesting: it is primarily taking a stand against housing 
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shortage as well as the criminalisation of homelessness 
and is committed to the construction of social housing. 
The movement belongs to Hungary’s progressive forces 
and advocates the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, 
including women. Left-wing feminist activists are also 
involved.
For the progressive parties it may be advisable to stand 
shoulder to shoulder with these movements, learn from 
them and develop a joint vision of society, in particular 
for women (and not only those of the middle class).
With regard to gender policy, the demarcation line does 
not correspond to the common party political dividing 
lines (conservative, liberal, left-wing), therefore, the 
question arises whether the progressive parties will be 
able to embed the gender issue in a broader context, 
namely the inclusion of disadvantaged and excluded 
groups, such as the poor and ethnic minorities, for 
example, the Roma. It is also worth clarifying whether 
there is a way to agree on minimum standards regarding 
family policy and gender policy issues  – beyond party 
political cleavages. With the demographic discourse, 
the initiatives concerning violence against women and 
the recognition of social professions, there seem to be 
chances.
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6.  Sweden
6.1  Facts and Figures
  The European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender 
Equality Index for 2012 was 74.2 (out of 100). Compared 
to the first measurement in 2005 this means an 
improvement of 1.4 points, though, the score decreased 
by 0.2 points compared to the last measurement in 
2010. Nevertheless, Sweden still heads the index, ranking 
before Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands.
  The gender pay gap in Sweden, at 15.8 per cent, is 
close to the EU average of 16.4  per cent. It widened 
again in 2014 for the first time in years.
  Women’s employment rate is 77 per cent compared 
with 82 per cent for men, putting Sweden well above the 
Lisbon target of 60 per cent.
  In particular among mothers with children 0–6 years 
of age the level of employment is very high, at 76.6 per 
cent.
  30  per cent of working women and 11  per cent 
of working men work part-time (the EU averages are 
32.5 per cent and 9.4 per cent, respectively).
  Normal working time in Sweden is 40 hours a week. 
Average normal working time in 2008 was 33.7 hours for 
women and 37.6 hours for men.
  Women thus do, on average, just under 4 hours less 
paid work a week than men (Sweden is therefore below 
the EU average of 6.4  hours. In many other western 
European countries the gender time gap is much worse.)
  The difference in the time men and women spend 
in unpaid work is diminishing, mainly because women’s 
unpaid hours are falling. Thus in 2010/2011 women 
spent on average 26 hours a week in unpaid work, while 
in 1990/1991 it was around 33 hours a weeks. Men spent 
21 hours a week on house work during both periods.
  With regard to equality in working life there are still a 
number of serious shortcomings in Sweden, as in many 
other European countries. For example, although the 
proportion of women in executive positions is increasing 
and rose from 29 to 36  per cent between 2006 and 
2012 – putting it just over the EU28 average of 33 per 
cent – developments in the private sector lag well behind 
those in the public sector:
  While the majority of executive positions in the 
public administration are held by women (64 per 
cent), the proportion of women in supervisory 
boards and executive boards of listed companies is 
a mere 4 per cent.
  Overall, the proportion of women in executive 
positions in the private sector is around 25 per cent.
  Currently, policy measures are being discussed 
aimed at increasing the proportion of women in 
executive positions in the private sector.
  The proportion of women in the Swedish Parliament 
is traditionally high. After the parliamentary elections in 
2010 women held 45 per cent of the seats, which was 
the first decline since the 1930s (in 2006 the figure was 
47 per cent).
  Currently, since the election in 2014, the cabinet of 
the Social Democrat/Greens minority government has 
12 women out of 23 ministers, besides the prime minister.
  The birth rate in Sweden of 1.9 children per woman 
is relatively high compared with other western European 
countries (with the exception of France).
  Parental leave:
  Sweden has a highly developed and flexible 
parental leave system, which is supposed to 
encourage and enable both parents to spend time 
with their children.
  Parental leave totals 480 days (16  months), for 
390 days of which (13 months) benefit of 80 per 
cent of the previous gross wage is paid  – if the 
recipient previously worked for at least 240 days 
and up to a maximum annual income of 
445,000 SEK (51,864 euros) – or a minimum rate 
of 225 SEK (just under 25 euros) per day. On top 
of that, 90 days are paid at a fixed rate of 180 SEK 
(21 euros).
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  Parental leave can be claimed up to the child’s 
eighth birthday or the completion of the first 
year of schooling. Days can also be taken as 3/4, 
1/2, 1/4 and 1/8 days, with total duration being 
prolonged accordingly.
  In most instances parental leave  – in accordance 
with this right to flexible use – is extended beyond 
the originally intended 16 months, so that children 
as a rule go into full-day care at the age of one and 
a half years.
  Out of the 480 days parental leave at the moment 
60 days (two months) are reserved for each parent, 
while the remaining 360 days can be divided flexibly 
between father and mother. In 2016 the reserved 
days will increase to 90 days (three months).
  There is a right to take three consecutive periods of 
parental leave in a year, although in practice many 
employers allow further periods.
  Since 2012 up to 30 days can be taken by both 
parents together, up to the completion of the first 
year of a child’s life (double-days).
  Women take 75  per cent of total parental leave 
days, men 25 per cent.
  Besides state benefits a majority of employees – in 
Sweden the level of trade union organisation is still 
very high, as is collective agreement coverage  – 
receive further benefits during parental leave laid 
down in collective agreements.
  Speed bonus:
  If another child is born or adopted within 
30  months, benefits during parental leave are 
assessed in accordance with income before the 
birth/adoption of the first child. This is particularly 
important for parents who reduce their working 
time after the birth of the child.
  Gender equality bonus:
  The gender equality bonus was introduced to 
encourage a more equitable distribution of parental 
leave.
  Both parents receive tax relief in the amount of 
50 SEK (6 euros) per day if they distribute parental 
leave equally – for nine of the total of 13 months 
a maximum bonus of 13,500 SEK (around 
1,550 euros) is available.
  It is disputed whether the intended effect – to get 
men to take more parental leave – could actually 
be achieved by this means. Due to this, the Gender 
Equality Bonus will be scrapped in 2017.
  Temporary parental allowance:
  Up to 10 days can be taken in the run up to a 
birth and in the case of adoption of children 
below 10  years of age both parents can claim 
5 days temporary parental allowance, which they 
can distribute as they choose (up to a maximum 
60 days after birth or the award of custody). Single 
adoptive parents can take the entire 10 days.
  Furthermore, there is an option of paid release 
from work to look after sick children. Temporary 
parental allowance can also be claimed in this 
instance. For example, if children have to be taken 
to the doctor, but also for child care if one partner 
has to take another child to the doctor or for cases 
in which the regular caregiver (partner, relative, 
child minder) is ill.
  Release from work is accompanied by the 
provision of temporary parental allowance (tillfällig 
föräldrapenning) in the amount of 80  per cent 
of income (up to a maximum annual income of 
333,700 SEK [39,277 euros] for up to 120 days 
a year and child under 12 years of age and with 
a sick note for children between 12 and 15 years 
of age).
  Days of temporary parental allowance can also be 
taken pro rata.
  Up to 60 days can be used for staying with small 
children if the regular carer is sick.
  Since 2001, days can also be transferred and taken 
by third persons (for example, grandparents or 
neighbours).
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  Care allowance:
  Care allowance is paid in Sweden after parental 
leave has been used up for children under 3 years 
of age as a tax-free allowance in the amount 
of 3,000 SEK (around 344 euros) per month, if 
children continue to be cared for at home and not 
in publically funded childcare institutions.
  The recently elected centre-left government has 
abolished care allowance. From 2016 it will not be 
possible to apply for the benefit anymore.
  Child benefit:
  In Sweden a tax-free child benefit (barnbidrag) is 
paid to all parents with children up to 16  years 
of age. From the second child a supplement is 
paid which, under certain circumstances, can be 
paid beyond the sixteenth year up to the child’s 
twentieth year.
  For children born after 1 March 2014 child benefit 
is now paid automatically, half and half, to both 
parents. Thus both parents receive 525 SEK a 
month.
  When a child attends secondary school the Swedish 
National Board for Student Aid pays a training 
allowance after child benefit has expired.
  Until children reach the age of 8 or have completed 
their first year of school there is a right to reduce working 
time by up to 25 per cent without wage compensation.
  In Sweden there is also a right to a place in public, 
full-day child care institutions, also for the unemployed.
  In 2002 low fee ceilings were introduced for 
mainly publicly funded child care, whereby most 
regional differences were eliminated (3 per cent of 
household income for the first child, 2 per cent for 
the second child and 1 per cent for the third child).
  The gender pension gap  – that is, the difference 
between the average gross pension of women and men 
over 64 years of age – is 33 per cent in Sweden, below 
the European average (EU27) of 39 per cent.
  Concerning how Swedish society treats its oldest 
members, the country did very well in the Global Age 
Watch Index 2014 – which refers to the care situation, 
financial security, life expectancy and social involvement 
of older people – taking second place out of 91 countries.
  Care-giving relatives are remunerated to some extent 
for nursing services they provide by municipalities and in 
such cases are employed by the municipality.
  Since 2009 same-sex couples have had the right to get 
married, which also confers on them the right to adopt 
Swedish and foreign children. The right to adoption was 
already – since 2002 – among the rights that accompanied 
partnerships for same-sex couples introduced in 1995. In 
2009 this was superseded by the right to get married.
6.2  Current Developments and Debates
Internationally, Sweden is a role model with regard to 
modern and successful family and equal opportunity 
policies. Many Swedes are proud of this. The far-reaching 
equality between the genders has – as in other Nordic 
countries  – become part of Sweden’s political culture. 
The ranking of the Global Gender Gap Report 2014, 
issued by the World Economic Forum, can serve as an 
indicator of Sweden’s progressive equal opportunity 
policy. Sweden takes fourth place after Iceland, Finland 
and Norway. The considerable social and political salience 
of gender issues in Sweden is also highlighted by the fact 
that in recent years the »Feminist Initiative« has had 
considerable electoral success in some municipalities and 
even gained entry to the European Parliament. At the 
general election in 2014, however, it failed – only just – to 
reach the 4 per cent threshold.
Equal opportunity policy is often credited with the fact 
that a large proportion of women (77 per cent) are in 
employment in Sweden, while, at the same time, the 
birth rate of 1.9 children per woman is relatively high 
by European comparison (EU average 1.6). Comparative 
research on family policy in European countries has 
confirmed the strong connection between a dual carer 
model and relatively high birth rates.
Family and equal opportunity policy in Sweden is closely 
linked to Sweden’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party 
(Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti), which – with 
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brief intervals – has dominated Swedish politics since the 
1930s. Although this dominance was broken in 2006 
and a centre-right coalition came to power, since 2014 
the Social Democratic Party has once again been the 
strongest party in the Swedish parliament, forming a 
minority government with the Greens.
Since the early 1970s the establishment of a dual carer 
model has been pursued step by step, with a range 
of reforms, with parents being encouraged to share 
employment and unpaid care work. The basis for this is 
formed by individual taxation, introduced as early as 1971; 
the expansion for over 40 years of affordable and high-
quality public all-day child care from the end of the first 
year of a child’s life; and the establishment of particular 
rights and obligations for fathers. Initially, the focus was 
on enabling women to take up employment, although 
increasingly the emphasis shifted to encouraging men 
to take more responsibility for care work. The stress 
on equal rights and obligations for both parents is also 
expressed by the consistent application of gender-neutral 
language in legal texts.
Underlying the bulk of family-policy instruments is 
the assumption that both partners will be in work. 
Furthermore, the design of support measures is flexible 
in order to accommodate individual cases to the 
largest extent possible. At the same time, family-policy 
instruments contain strong incentives for the equal 
distribution of care work, which has been successively 
expanded since the relevant instruments were introduced.
This is particularly clear with regard to parental leave. 
For example, straight after the introduction of parental 
insurance and the related parental allowance  – which 
at that time was paid for the first six months after 
birth – parental leave was freely distributed between the 
parents. In the 1980s parental leave was extended – to 
one year, with a further three months for which a lower 
flat-rate benefit was available  – and in 1995 a month 
was reserved for each parent. This so-called »mum’s« 
or »dad’s« month, which cannot be transferred to the 
other partner, had a direct effect on the take-up of 
parental leave by fathers, whose proportion rose by 10 
days, on average. Since 2002 parental leave has totalled 
16 months and the reserved months increased to two. 
The introduction of this second reserved month increased 
the average parental leave taken by fathers by another 
seven days. By 2012 the proportion of parental leave 
used by fathers amounted to one-quarter of the whole 
(91 days). In 2015 the centre-left government decided to 
increase the amount of reserved leave even more. From 
2016 onwards three months will be reserved for both 
parents. However, the overall lengths of parental leave 
stayed the same.
A particular focus of Swedish family policy is the provision 
of high quality whole-day child care, with the quality of 
care and the training of pedagogical staff being the focus 
of policy measures. Fifty-one per cent of children under 
3 years of age and 95 per cent of children between 3 and 
6 years of age receive formal child care. In recent decades 
child care provision has become more varied; for example, 
day nurseries are provided by parental initiatives or other 
organisations, while the number of private whole-day 
care centres has also increased. All establishments are 
state-supported and subject to quality-assurance meas-
ures. There are no extra fees even for alternative private 
provision. People employed in child care are predomi-
nantly highly qualified. Around 60 per cent of pre-school 
teachers have completed three years’ higher education. 
In addition, most child care institutions have long opening 
hours – from 6.30 to 18.30 – which facilitates reconcilia-
tion of full-time activity and family life.
Disincentives for dual earner households have been 
removed by a series of reforms. The most far-reaching 
reform was introduced as early as the 1970s, when 
separate taxation was introduced for spouses. There 
was a transitional period of 20  years during which 
the system was converted to individual taxation. As a 
consequence, in combination with progressive taxation, 
two low incomes became more economically beneficial 
for families than a single higher income (usually that of 
the man).
Another significant reform area in family policy was the 
strengthening of fathers’ rights and obligations with 
regard to custody. For example, in 1998 the courts 
were for the first time given the authority to award joint 
custody, even against the will of one of the parents. 
Today, the task of getting parents to reach agreement on 
custody and children’s residence voluntarily lies primarily 
with the social authorities, as a result of which the courts 
only rarely deal with custody cases. Overall, the Swedish 
solution has brought about a stronger emphasis on joint 
responsibility of parents and in the event of divorce joint 
custody has become the norm. This has also led to a larger 
42
ON THE wAY TO GENDER EquALITY?  |  SwEDEN
proportion of children spending half their time with their 
father and half with their mother, which appears to have 
positive effects on children’s emotional health. In 2005 
the law was changed once again to make it easier for one 
parent to obtain sole custody if the other parent fails to 
fulfil their obligations. However, this change has led to a 
doubling in the number of judicial disputes.
In Sweden the bulk of tax-funded care provision is 
furnished by the 289 municipalities, while central 
government largely restricts itself to laying out the basic 
guidelines. What is available to those in need of care 
as either in- or outpatients is very broad, including care 
provision from private suppliers. Provision ranges from 
various types of accommodation for those in need to 
various kinds of domestic utility services, such as »meals 
on wheels«, help with cleaning and shopping, transport 
services and the installation of emergency call systems. 
The emphasis of care policy is on benefits in kind, designed 
to »help people to help themselves« and to enable them 
to live self-determined lives for as long as possible. To 
that end an individualised approach is taken, which 
provides for numerous levels of provision and enables 
individual solutions. Overall, Sweden spends a relatively 
high proportion of GDP, by European comparison, on 
care provision (around 3.5 per cent compared with the 
European average of 1.2 per cent).
Although Sweden – after 12 years of uninterrupted Social 
Democratic government – was ruled by a conservative-
liberal coalition between 2006 and 2014, which stood 
for a more traditional approach to family policy and 
legislated accordingly, even this government did not call 
into question the basic pillars of Swedish family policy. 
The conservatives did, however, seek to put what it saw 
as »freedom of choice« at the centre of family-policy 
debates. Some of its reforms were aimed at strengthening 
the dual carer principle, while others tended towards 
a stronger traditionalisation of family life and cleared 
a path for more »market« solutions. The centre-right 
coalition did not always present a united front on family-
policy issues. While the Christian Democrats campaigned 
for measures  – such as care allowance  – that tend to 
promote traditional family forms, the Liberals advocated 
measures aimed at gender equality. Thus the design 
of policy measures in many cases turned out to be a 
compromise between the two positions.
Perhaps the most prominent legacy of the period of 
conservative government is child allowance, which was 
introduced in 2008 and is paid to parents with children 
below 3 years of age who care for them at home and 
not in state-financed institutions. Although the measure 
is basically oriented towards women and men, it clearly 
supports traditional family patterns. The project was 
extremely controversial from the outset and the decision 
on whether to introduce it was left to municipalities. In 
2011 care allowance was applied for 2.5 per cent of all 
children between 1 and 3 years of age, corresponding 
to 4.7 per cent of children in the municipalities in which 
care allowance was introduced; 92 per cent of applicants 
were women. By mid-2013 around one-third of Swedish 
municipalities had introduced care allowance. Recently, 
the 2014 elected centre-left government decided to 
abolish care allowance. From 2016 it will not be possible 
to apply for the benefit anymore.
A number of changes were also made to parental leave 
and temporary parental allowance. In order to further 
increase the proportion of fathers taking parental leave, 
an »equality bonus« was introduced in 2008 (see above). 
The equality bonus is particularly beneficial for parents on 
low incomes. With the introduction of the equality bonus 
the distribution of parental leave between mothers and 
fathers changed somewhat, however. In any case, only 
a few of those eligible claimed this benefit, presumably 
because the application procedure was so complex. 
Therefore, the centre-left government decided to scrap 
the Gender Equality Bonus in 2017 as well.
In 2010 a new provision was introduced in the social 
insurance system designed to help single parents who 
are unable to take care of their children due to illness. 
This awards parental allowance, possibly temporarily, to 
another insured person – in other words, someone legally 
resident and/or working in Sweden – who gives up paid 
work to look after a child.
Another family-policy project of the centre-right coalition 
was the introduction of tax deductibility for the cost of 
domestic help. Up to a fairly high ceiling 50  per cent 
of such costs can be set off against tax. This concerns 
cleaning, but also spending on babysitters. On one hand, 
this measure is aimed at helping families in which both 
parents are working full time and career-oriented, while 
on the other hand, it is supposed to provide an incentive 
to establish an official labour market for nursing and 
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care services. The measure encountered various criticisms 
early on because in particular households on high 
incomes would benefit, while a labour market would be 
created largely for low qualified and poorly paid domestic 
workers. In 2010 around 4  per cent of households 
claimed tax deductions on such costs. While in the 
lowest income quartile only 1.6 per cent of households 
with minor children made use of tax deductibility, ten 
times as many did so in the highest income quartile. The 
latter group also accounted for around two-thirds of 
the amount deducted. The measure was not particularly 
successful with regard to the second aim – increasing the 
number of official jobs – either. Ultimately, the reform 
particularly boosted the career opportunities of higher 
earners.
During the centre-right coalition’s period in office the 
lower and upper thresholds of parental allowance were 
also changed. Thus the fixed sum paid regardless of 
previous earnings was gradually raised from 60 SEK 
(around 6.5 euros) to 225 SEK (26 euros) a day. This 
partly made up for long overdue adjustments to wage 
and price changes, but it also reduced the incentive to 
work before parental leave.
Many privatisation initiatives were also launched by 
the centre-right government, which sometimes led to 
a deterioration of the care situation. This was due in 
particular to the increased use of poorly qualified staff, on 
one hand because of the lack of qualified care personnel 
and on the other hand in an effort to cut costs. Efforts 
were also made to implement »market« solutions, for 
example, through the introduction of voucher systems.
Current equal opportunity policy is based on a long 
tradition of progressive policy approaches. The official 
aim of equal opportunity policy in Sweden is to put men 
and women in a position to shape society and their own 
lives equally. Besides equal access to education and 
paid employment, as well as combating gender-based 
violence, the focus of gender policy in Sweden is on 
the equal distribution of power and influence, together 
with the equal allocation of care and unpaid housework 
between men and women. The economic potential 
of gender equality for generating economic growth is 
also emphasised because better use is made of people’s 
individual potential, for example, in the workplace.
Equal opportunity policy in Sweden is also firmly 
anchored at the institutional level. For example, there 
is a minister for gender equality. Over time this ministry 
has had a number of different homes, transferring in 
2014 from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs. Currently, in the new centre-
left government, the post is held by Social Democrat Åsa 
Regnér. Besides the institutional anchoring of equality 
and gender issues in all ministries, the Minister for 
Gender Equality and her Department of Equality Policy 
are responsible for the coordination of government 
policy, special equality initiatives and the development of 
appropriate implementation methods.
Currently, family policy is not particularly high on the 
list of political priorities, however. The main focus is 
unemployment, which is running at 7–8 per cent, and the 
rising youth unemployment, which is now 20 per cent in 
Sweden, although the figure is distorted by the structures 
of the education and training system and the fact that 
students looking for work are also included. There is 
also intense discussion of the integration of immigrants, 
also with regard to their inclusion in the labour market. 
Sweden has traditionally had a very liberal asylum policy 
and by EU comparison had by far the highest rate of 
asylum seekers in 2014: 8.4 asylum seekers for every 
1,000 inhabitants compared with Germany’s 2.5, for 
example. However, with the rsising number of refugees 
coming to the EU even the Swedish system comes under 
increasing pressure. Labour market developments and 
high immigration have contributed substantially to the 
rapid rise of the right-wing populist Party of Sweden 
Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna). In future, the centre-
left government will be gauged by how it deals with this 
problem.
Overall, Sweden remains a model country with regard to 
gender equality. Although the generous, publicly funded 
social provisions that supported the dual earner model 
came under pressure during the term of office of the 
centre-right coalition and the unfavourable development 
of the Swedish labour market, to date this has not led to 
the erosion of the widely held ideal of extensive gender 
equality in Swedish society. It will be interesting to see 
whether the centre-left minority government will manage 
to implement its policy ideas against the background of 
the economic situation and steer policy back towards a 
more extensive welfare state.
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6.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
After the electoral defeats in 2006 and 2010 Sweden’s 
Social Democratic Party underwent a process of 
personal and policy renewal. This culminated in the 
slogan »framtidspartiet«, »party of the future«, and 
the assumption of the party leadership by Stefan Löfven 
in 2012, who was previously leader of the trade union 
IF Metall. The main emphasis in welfare state policy was 
the idea of the »Nordic model«, which historically was 
established and has been developed by Social Democrats, 
based on universal access to state provision. At the heart 
of the election campaign in 2014 were issues such as 
education, health care and employment, in particular such 
problems as the declining quality of the education and 
health care systems and the high (youth) unemployment. 
The Social Democrats managed to emerge from the 
election by far the largest party in parliament, but it 
was long uncertain whether it would be able to form a 
government. Finally, a minority government was formed 
with the Green Party, which after a tug-of-war – and the 
threat of a new election – got a draft budget through 
parliament at the second attempt, which enabled them 
to govern, albeit at the price of a few compromises.
Election Issues 2014
  The centre-right coalition’s privatisation policy in the 
realm of public services came in for particular criticism. 
Among other things, profit withdrawals by service 
providers in education and elderly care and in the running 
of refugee centres were discussed; such providers make 
high profits on the back of tax payers’ money.
  Sweden is performing markedly worse in rankings 
related to the quality of its education and health care 
systems, among others the Euro Health Consumer Index 
(EHCI) and PISA studies.
  In parallel with these developments, as a result of 
several tax reduction packages, the share of taxes in GDP 
fell from 48.9 per cent in 2005 to 44.6 per cent in 2012, 
which has increased the pressure on public services.
  Although the Social Democratic Party did not oppose 
private solutions (and the resulting profits) in principle 
during the election campaign, there was a stronger focus 
on standards and the prospect of tighter regulation was 
held out.
  At the heart of the party’s political message was 
access to welfare state provisions, bearing in mind that 
segregation has increased in both education and health 
care.
  Another election issue was teacher training and raising 
the status of the teaching profession. The recruitment of 
more teachers and an improvement in teachers’ pay were 
among the key projects raised in the election.
Political Discussions and Planned Measures of the 
Newly Elected Centre-Left Government under the 
Leadership of Stefan Löfven
The following remarks concern measures contained in 
the first draft budget introduced to parliament by the 
government. As expected, it was unable to achieve a 
majority in the vote on 3 December 2014. However, it 
can be assumed that subsequent budgets will contain 
similar items.
The government goes so far as to describe itself, within the 
framework of its presentation of gender policy measures 
in the draft budget, as a feminist government, which 
recognises gender equality as a transversal objective and 
intends to strengthen gender mainstreaming in all policy 
areas. The key equality policy issues in the budget are 
as follows: more support for women’s shelters provided 
by civil society organisations and other measures in the 
campaign against male violence against women; the 
establishment of greater economic equality between 
women and men; the organisation of working life in 
accordance with gender fairness; and the improvement 
of health care provision for women.
Reduction of Pensioners’ Tax Burden
  In the first draft budget the reduction of pensioners’ 
tax burden was envisaged, with particular attention to 
women’s income.
Increase in Maintenance Payments
  The increase in maintenance payments of 300 SEK 
a month per child provided for in the draft budget was 
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aimed at improving the economic situation of single 
parents.
Equitable Take-Up and Other Aspects of 
Parental Leave
  There have been discussions for some time in the 
centre-left spectrum on measures that might be able 
to further increase the proportion of parental leave 
taken by men. In the draft budget the introduction of an 
additional »father’s/mother’s month« was announced for 
2016, which means that in future three instead of two 
months will be reserved for both partners.
  Furthermore, there is also a plan to raise the minimum 
level of wage replacement payment provided for the 
period of parental leave.
Other Policy Plans Related to Equality Policy
  Measures and programmes to prevent the exclusion of 
women from working life.
  Gathering information concerning illness and working 
environment, in particular in relation to women’s working 
environments.
  In addition, health care for women is to be improved.
  In total, 208  million SEK was set aside for special 
projects to improve gender equality.
Other Equality Policy Positions
Women’s Quotas for Executive Positions in the 
Private Sector
  In his government statement newly elected prime 
minister Löfven announced his intention to introduce a 
women’s quota for supervisory boards (on the model of 
Norway), unless the proportion of women on supervisory 
boards increases by 2016.
Abolition of Care Allowance
  After the instalment of the new government a legislative 
initiative was prepared to abolish care allowance, which 
indicates that the government parties can count on the 
support of the Liberals to overcome the advocates of 
this measure in parliament (Christian Democrats and the 
right-wing populist Sweden Democrats).
Other Actors
Feministiskt initiative – Feminist Party
  The Feminist Party criticises the fact that women 
continue to be exposed to multifarious forms of 
discrimination in society, especially in the labour market: 
women earn less than men for the same work, shoulder 
more unpaid care and house work, are at greater risk 
of having to take on involuntary part-time work and 
are overrepresented in precarious forms of employment. 
According to the Feminist Party every second woman in 
Sweden risks falling into poverty after retirement.
  Its policy plans include the following:
  elimination of all forms of discrimination in 
the labour market, for example, by imposing 
appropriate standards in public procurement
  ending the withdrawal of private profits within the 
framework of public services
  individualisation of parental insurance, 
accompanied by a parity-based distribution of days 
between women and men
  raising minimum pensions and reform of the 
pension system
  introduction of a six-hour day to reduce work-
related health risks and enable better reconciliation 
of work and family life
  enhancement of critical pedagogical approaches 
in education and increasing awareness of racism, 
sexism and discrimination against disabled people 
and LGBTQ people in teaching
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7.  Switzerland
7.1  Facts and Figures
  Gender pay gap: 18.4 per cent
  Women’s employment rate: 71.1 per cent
  Women’s part-time rate: 58 per cent
  Among women with children under 15 years of age, 
13 per cent are in full-time employment.
  Men’s part-time rate: 14.5  per cent (with a rising 
trend)
  In the 100 largest companies in Switzerland women 
make up only 6 per cent of the members of boards of 
directors.
  State/development of child care: on average, a full-
time child care place is available for 11  per cent of 
children of preschool age and for 8 per cent of children 
of school age. Provision varies considerably, however.
  Women in employment receive earnings replacement 
benefit for 14 weeks after giving birth, corresponding to 
80 per cent of their wage (maternity allowance). There is 
no paid leave option for fathers.
  Women in politics: With a 30 per cent share of women 
in the national parliament Switzerland is above average 
by international comparison; this share has remained 
static for years, however.
  A law on »registered partnerships« was adopted by 
referendum in 2005 and has been in force since 2007. 
Access to IVF treatment and adoption – also adoption of 
step-children – by same-sex couples are not permitted.
7.2  Current Developments and Debates
In Switzerland, reconciliation of work and family life 
is traditionally considered a private matter. Generally 
speaking, a conservative view of the family prevails in 
Switzerland. Women are regarded as chiefly responsible 
for child care. Mothers who would like to take on a full 
workload or work full-time are somewhat frowned upon. 
In public debates Switzerland is often characterised as 
a »developing country« with regard to family policy. 
In recent years, however, it has come to be generally 
acknowledged in the political sphere that families need a 
suitable environment. For the Federal Council (Bundesrat), 
improving the reconciliation of work and family life is a 
»political priority«. However, to date, child care provision 
outside the family has been meagre in Switzerland (see 
above) and there is a substantial divide between urban 
and rural. Overall, family policy in Switzerland is strongly 
shaped by federalism. The federal government cedes 
the bulk of the relevant competences – as in many other 
areas – to the cantons and the municipalities. Provision 
therefore varies considerably. That applies in particular 
to the school system and the arrangements for child care 
outside the family. Many, though not all cantons and 
municipalities have made improving the reconciliation of 
work and family life an explicit goal. Thus there are strong 
regional differences: in urban areas and in francophone 
Switzerland the provision is much better than in the rest 
of the country. Here the majority of people now have 
access to child care. The costs of child care are socially 
adjusted. For couples on regular wages the costs are 
relatively high, which means that in particular for (lower) 
middle class families it pays only to a limited extent 
(especially in combination with the provisions allowing 
couples to split income tax) for both partners to be in 
work.
The particular manner in which a federal structure is 
interwoven with direct democracy in Switzerland 
time and again proves to be an impeding factor for a 
comprehensive and modern family and gender policy. 
One result of this special variant of democracy was 
that women did not obtain the vote until 1971. In 
national referendums both a popular majority and a 
majority of the cantons (Ständemehr) must be achieved 
for a motion to pass. Because more conservative rural 
cantons outnumber the more progressive urban and 
francophone cantons they can block progress in family 
and gender policy. This happened in March  2013, for 
example, when a »federal resolution on family policy« 
was put to the vote after a parliamentary initiative by the 
Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP). The initiative 
provided for changes to an article of the constitution on 
family policy; the aim was to strengthen family policy 
competences at the federal level, especially with regard 
to reconciliation of work and family life. The cantons 
would be required to »offer needs-based provision of 
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day-care facilities to supplement family and school care«. 
If the efforts of the cantons proved to be inadequate 
the federal government would have been duty-bound 
to »establish a general framework for promoting the 
reconciliation of employment and the family«. A majority 
of Swiss citizens accepted the initiative, but it was unable 
to obtain the requisite cantonal majority. Foremost 
among the opponents was the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP); the FDP was split. The opposition’s line of attack 
was based on arguments about freedom and justice: the 
state should not be too closely involved in the raising of 
children (»Staatskinder? Nein!« [State children? No!]) 
and not discriminate against those who look after their 
children themselves.
Since 2003 and the adoption of the federal law on 
»financial assistance for supplementary child care« there 
have been efforts to boost the creation of additional day-
care places for children; the number of care places has 
almost doubled during this period. After the temporary 
curtailment of the programme at the beginning of 2013 
because of the early exhaustion of the credit, at the end 
of 2014 a second prolongation was agreed until the 
end of 2019. The issue of quality of care is increasing in 
importance; around 44 per cent of those employed as 
caregivers have no professional training. Just over half 
of the cantons contribute to the costs of kindergartens 
and day-care families; however, parents continue to 
bear the bulk of the costs. Although these costs are tax 
deductible (with an upper limit) the functioning of the 
tax system (splitting of income tax), in combination with 
the relatively high child care costs, makes it unattractive 
for dual earners to accept a place or increase the number 
of hours.
Although the SVP has been successful in blocking family 
and gender policy initiatives it has not managed to push 
through initiatives of its own. In November 2013 it 
launched the »family initiative«. Its aim was to introduce 
tax deductions for parents who care for their children 
at home  – in compensation for the fact that external 
child care costs are tax deductible. Initial opinion polls 
indicated a majority of 64  per cent in favour of the 
»family initiative«. These results mobilised the opponents 
of the move, however, and triggered a no campaign. This 
was aimed at the traditional model of the family, which 
the measure would have cemented (»Herdpremie«, 
allowance for remaining at home), although even more 
at the projected loss of tax revenues. There was a clear 
confrontation across the party spectrum: on one hand, 
there was the SVP, which defended the »family initiative« 
with the argument that families are a private affair and 
child raising is primarily the task of parents. On the 
other hand, against the »family initiative« were all the 
other parties, with a range of emphases. Both the SP 
and the centre-right CVP and FDP oppose the »family 
initiative« with a demand for better reconciliation of 
work and family life. The FDP emphasised the economic 
advantages of stronger labour market participation 
among women. The CVP describes itself as the »family 
party«. It emphasises the equality of all models of the 
family: neither traditional nor modern models should 
receive particular support from the state; rather families 
should be ensured maximum freedom to choose. For the 
SP, women’s economic independence and the social and 
financial security of the family are the most important 
issues.
One obstacle to equality in Switzerland is the school 
system. There are lessons in Swiss schools both in the 
morning and the afternoon. The lunchtime break is 
around two hours, during which time children are 
supposed to eat at home; implicit in this assumption is that 
mothers cook for the family. Such long lunchbreaks are 
also common in the world of work, although things have 
begun to change in recent years. For a number of years 
some schools have offered »supervised lunchbreaks«, 
often on the basis of private initiatives. Provision varies 
sharply between cantons and municipalities.
Switzerland is a country of part-time employment 
and not only with regard to women. While full-time 
employment is still almost sacrosanct for men in many 
European countries, the proportion of men working 
part-time in Switzerland is increasing. That is not the 
outcome of legislation, government incentives or trade 
union activities, however. Rather the movement towards 
men working part-time is coming from civil society. For 
example, the initiative »TEILZEITMANN« (Part-time man) 
is committed to the reconciliation of career and part-
time working for men, with the slogan »Real men have 
part-time careers« (literally, »whole men have part-time 
careers«). The project is backed by the equality authority, 
which thus makes it clear that it considers equality policy 
not just to be about women or about improving hourly 
pay for women and giving them more opportunities for 
advancement by getting more men to work part-time. 
Also conducive to the reconciliation of work and family 
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life in Switzerland is the fact that there is a relatively 
high degree of flexibility with regard to working hours: 
for example, flexitime is almost as widespread as in the 
Nordic countries.
In order to get more women into leading management 
positions, in November 2013 the Federal Council decided 
to introduce a »target quota« of 30 per cent women for 
the supervisory boards of 24 federally owned companies 
(by 2020). This is not a binding quota, however, merely a 
voluntary commitment. Only in the canton Basel-City was 
there a popular vote (in February 2014) clearly in favour of 
a binding women’s quota of 30 per cent for government 
and government-related companies and organisations 
(cantonal bank, hospitals). This is the first gender quota 
of its kind in Switzerland. This women’s quota was 
achieved because a red-green majority was supported by 
a cross-party alliance. Despite the opposition campaign 
among young middle class women (»we don’t want 
any women’s quotas«) the measure was passed with a 
67 per cent majority. The case of Basel-City shows that 
direct democracy can have favourable outcomes in urban 
areas. In other large cities and at federal level there have 
been similar plans, which failed. However, the women’s 
quota in the supervisory boards of public companies 
and in the public administration remains a »hot topic«. 
Initially, these demands came exclusively from the left, 
but in 2012 FDP Women also called for a quota, a clear 
divergence from party policy.
Since 2005 there has been »maternity allowance« in 
Switzerland, a kind of parental allowance, although 
solely for mothers (as the name implies). Working women 
receive an earnings replacement benefit for 14  weeks 
after the birth of the child, corresponding to 80 per cent 
of their income. Before 2005, companies rarely made 
such payments. No paid leave is provided for fathers; 
many companies grant fathers one or even a few days’ 
paid or unpaid leave after the birth of a child. There is no 
paternity leave in Switzerland. In 2011, SP member of the 
Swiss Council of States Anita Fetz submitted a motion to 
the Federal Council to look at a model of paternity leave. 
Various models were examined, but the report issued in 
2013 declared that »the Federal Council takes the view 
that the introduction of paternity leave or parental leave 
to improve reconciliation of work and family life does 
not have first priority because, in contrast to child care 
provisions supplementing family and school care, such 
leave would concern only a limited time after the birth of 
the child«. The calls for a legally enshrined paternity leave 
are becoming more frequent and vociferous, however. 
Besides the trade union federations and the SP Federal 
Council member Simonetta Sommaruga, the CVP is also 
in favour. It proposes that men should be able to take 
paternity leave in place of military refresher courses. All 
previous initiatives failed, however, because they were 
considered to be too costly. In 2005, »manner.ch«, the 
umbrella federation for men’s and fathers’ organisations 
was founded. Its key issues are the equality of men and 
women in the areas of work, the family and sexuality. 
The subproject teilzeitmann.ch (see above) has garnered 
much media attention.
Also the subject of constant discussion is the so-called 
»marriage penalty« with regard to pensions: pensions 
for married couples together are capped at 150 per cent 
of the maximum pension for individuals. Cohabiting 
couples (that is, unmarried but living together), by 
contrast, each receive a full pension. On the other hand, 
married couples receive a number of benefits, including 
the fact that only one person has to pay social security 
contributions. On top of that, survivor’s pensions, spousal 
splitting of income taxation and care credits for looking 
after one’s marriage partner favour married couples. 
In particular the CVP advocates the abolition of the 
»marriage penalty«. The SP points out the accompanying 
advantages of married status and takes the position that 
either all forms of relationship have to be put on an equal 
footing – which would require a massive expansion of 
the pension system – or the system should be left as it is.
At the end of 2013 for the first time more people 
were single than married. The Federal Council has 
acknowledged that this signals a decisive societal 
transformation and resolved  – in response to a 
corresponding postulate4 from National Council member 
Jaqueline Fehr in 2012  – to produce a report by the 
end of 2014 on how family law could be reformed to 
take account of this. The Department of Justice, headed 
by SP Federal Council member Simonetta Sommaruga, 
to that end commissioned a report in early 2014 from 
professor of civil law Ingeborg Schwenzer. The report 
contained a number of unconventional ideas: certain 
legal institutions should no longer be linked to marriage 
status, but rather to »life partnerships« that have been 
4.  A postulate requires the Federal Council to examine whether it is 
appropriate either to submit a draft federal assembly bill or to take 
appropriate measures and to present a report on the subject.
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in existence for at least three years and in which there 
is a child. Furthermore, same-sex couples should be 
allowed to marry, the ban on incest should be abolished, 
polygamous marriages should be permitted and a child’s 
parents should not have to be of different genders. 
Before the proposals could give rise to a broader and 
more serious debate, however, discussions focused on 
the reaction of the SVP National Council, which had 
declared, in response to the Schwenzer report, that 
homosexuals are »misguided«. The concluding report 
»Modernising Family Law« followed in March 2013. At 
its centre is the equality of forms of cohabitation with 
and without marriage, as well as registered partnerships. 
To that end the Federal Council wants, on one hand, to 
create a new form of »legally regulated partnership with 
weaker legal effect than marriage« on the model of the 
French »Pacte civile de solidarité«, and on the other hand 
the civil statuses of »single« and »divorced« are to be 
replaced by »not married«. Parliament was tasked with 
working out the relevant laws. In comparison with the 
first report the media had almost nothing to say about 
this one.
Currently, the main object of discussion is the possibility 
of adopting step-children (both in the government and in 
the public debate). At the end of 2013 a corresponding 
draft was submitted for consultation on revision of 
the civil code. Besides the SP and the Greens, the BDP 
(Conservative Democratic Party, a moderate breakaway 
party from the right-wing populist SVP) and, after 
prolonged wrangling, the FDP favour the adoption of 
step-children. The CVP and the SVP strongly reject an 
adoption law. An important NGO, which advocates 
equality for families of same-sex couples, is the Swiss 
Rainbow Families Association. Opening up marriage to 
same-sex couples is currently rather a marginal issue.
At the latest since early 2014 the issue of equality 
has been closely linked to the issue of immigration. In 
February 2014 the Swiss decided by a narrow majority 
to limit immigration (popular initiative »Against mass 
immigration«). The decision to impose a quota on 
immigration from EU countries triggered a debate on 
the looming skills shortage. One possible solution would 
be to improve women’s integration in the labour market. 
The confrontation embodied in »the advancement of 
women instead of immigration« as a kind of equality 
policy from the right, poses a challenge to progressive 
gender discourse.
The gender debate was also intertwined with another 
popular initiative in 2014. The trade union demand for 
a wage floor of 22 Swiss francs (around 18 euros) per 
hour embedded in the constitution was strongly rejected 
in May  2014. One widespread argument against the 
initiative was that mainly second-earners  – that is, 
women  – are affected by low wages and thus such 
wages mainly amount to additional earnings (»pocket 
or pin money«). Rejecting this view were primarily the SP 
Women and the Unia trade union (the largest member 
of the Swiss Trade Union Confederation). They stressed 
that a legal minimum wage is an important step for wage 
equality between women and men.
A gender policy debate that was most intense and 
polemical in 2014 concerned the project »Lehrplan 21« 
(»Curriculum 21«). In this project of the Swiss-German 
Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education (D-EDK) 
for the first time a common curriculum was worked out 
for primary schools in German-speaking cantons, which 
also includes the topic of »sexual diversity«. Opposition 
was strong and well organised. As early as 2011 there 
was a petition »Against the early sexualisation of primary 
schools«, which was supported by the national councils 
of the SVP, the FDP, the CVP and the ultra-right Christian 
EDU (Federal Democratic Union) and gathered a large 
number of signatures. Another online petition was called 
»No gender in Curriculum 21«. The petition was initiated 
jointly by the SVP and Christian groups; it criticises the 
inclusion of topics such as equality, gender and sexual 
orientation in Curriculum 21. It is directed against the 
dissemination of »left-wing ideologies« and demands 
that »all formulations and competences based on left-
wing ideologies, such as ›gender-specific discrimination‹, 
›gender-specific forms‹, ›transformation of gender 
relations‹, ›questioning gender stereotypes‹ and ›the 
term sexual orientation‹« be removed from Curriculum 
21. Instead, they propose the following: »addressing the 
issues of gender, gender roles and gender relations must 
be based on the natural differences between men and 
women that go beyond biological gender characteristics. 
Reducing these differences to the different socialisation 
of boys and girls is to be rejected as unscientific«.
Anti-feminist and anti-gender rhetoric currently feature 
strongly in some parts of the press. Particularly prominent 
are Weltwoche (circulation around 80,000) and the Basler 
Zeitung (BAZ, circulation around 60,000), which is close 
to the SPV. Key here are ideological suspicion (»gender 
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ideology«) and the reproach of being »unscientific«. 
Particularly polemical are the criticisms directed towards 
university institutions or individual academics. The SVP 
regularly calls for the abolition of municipal and cantonal 
gender equality offices because it considers them to be 
superfluous. This demand is now part of its manifesto. 
On the other hand, the wave of outrage when Swiss 
TV broadcast a documentary series on Swiss history 
(»The Swiss«) in autumn 2013 that featured solely 
male protagonists was astonishing. There is therefore 
polarisation in both directions.
7.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
The SP has adopted a basic position on »family policy«, 
but not on equality or gender policy. The SP identifies 
problems in particular with regard to low-income families 
(children at risk of poverty, one income in the family is 
not enough) and the lack of child care places. Among 
the proposed measures the focus is currently on the 
introduction of family income support for families at risk 
of poverty and tax credits for families, emphasising that 
the purpose of this is not simply to create new privileges 
for higher earners (fixed credits per child instead of 
income-dependent tax deductions for families).
The focus of the SP’s women’s organisation is on 
»economic equality between the genders«. This concerns 
not only equal rights but above all social and financial 
security. SP Women concentrate on the following issues: 
wage equality, provision for old age, health care, tax 
policy, the right to care at different stages of life and 
anti-discrimination. They are against unification of the 
retirement age (at present, women 64 and men 65). They 
advocate that, first, wage equality and reconciliation of 
work and family life must be improved. SP Women favour 
a revision of the Companies Act in the direction of a 
fixed 30 per cent quota for supervisory boards. Instead 
of the term »women’s quota« they use the term »gender 
quota« in order to avoid the reproach of advocating 
discrimination against men.
Legislative aims of the SP parliamentary party, 2011–
2015: In this document gender equality and family policy 
are addressed in more detail than in the party’s basic 
platform, in which the focus remains on family and social 
security. In the new paper for the period 2015–2019 
for the first time the equal treatment of all parents, 
regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity, 
was taken as basic position on family policy. Besides 
the aims already mentioned, the Party also demands the 
following:
Family and children:
  Expanded provision of child care places to help families 
outside school hours, as well as day-care schools offering 
supervised lunchbreaks.
  Introduction of parental leave of 24 weeks in total, 
including maternity leave of 14 weeks.
  Introduction of parental leave in accordance with 
the EU directive (although there is next to no public 
discussion of this issue).
  Development of new working time models and part-
time working for both sexes, even at upper management 
level.
  Free health insurance for children and young people 
in education or training up to 25  years of age (Swiss 
health insurance premiums are levied in accordance with 
income and extremely high by international comparison).
  Stronger integration efforts in order to boost the 
starting chances of children from immigrant families.
  Support for state schools as an important focus for 
integration.
Old people
  Boosting old age and survivors’ insurance (AHV) in 
order to ensure the subsistence of people on low and 
middle incomes.
  Flexible retirement age (62–65) depending on 
professional career and the arduousness of the work.
  Strategy for solving the problem of the lack of care 
personnel.
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Anti-discrimination
  The SP parliamentary party wants to make an active 
effort against discrimination on the grounds of gender 
and sexual orientation (Gender: reduction of the 
gender pay gap, 30 per cent quotas for political posts 
and administrative boards of semi-public enterprises, 
combating domestic violence. Sexual orientation: action 
against discrimination in the workplace and those seeking 
accommodation, facilitated naturalisation of partners in 
registered partnerships.). In the paper for 2015–2019 
it is proposed that homo- and transphobia be brought 
under the criminal provision for racism. In addition, for 
the first time opening up marriage to same-sex couples 
is demanded explicitly.
  Introduction of a general ban on discrimination 
within the meaning of the international women’s rights 
agreement (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women), which also includes 
sexual orientation.
  Awareness of CEDAW should be improved and its 
implementation supported.
  Combating sexism and gender stereotypes is 
mentioned for the first time in the paper for 2015–2019.
  The same goes for the upgrading of care work.
Summary: The focus of the SP’s gender, equality and 
family policies in Switzerland is clearly the family and 
its social and financial security. The party’s demands in 
these areas at present are formulated with regard to the 
question of how the situation of women (with children) 
can be improved. But a change is emerging here: within 
the party there is criticism of this one-sided approach. The 
younger generation in particular is demanding that the 
needs of men (with children) should also be considered. 
The reconciliation debate has also focused strongly on 
families with children, while dependents needing care 
are barely discussed (although in Switzerland care has 
traditionally been provided, unpaid, largely by women). 
The first steps in the direction of diversification of equality 
policy issues are evident in the new paper on the SP 
parliamentary party’s legislative aims for 2015–2019.
One major challenge facing the SP is the considerable 
regional differences in Switzerland in relation to both 
infrastructure and patterns of representation. The SP has 
a majority in almost every city (with the Greens), but in 
rural areas it is in a minority almost everywhere.
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8.  united Kingdom
8.1  Facts and Figures
  The gender pay gap, at 19.1 per cent, is just over the 
EU average (16.4 per cent). If one looks at only full-time 
employees it stands at 9.4 per cent (figures for November 
2014).
  71.3 per cent of women between 16 and 59 years of 
age are economically active (as against 78.3 per cent of 
men – figures for February to April 2015), although a lot 
more women than men work part-time (figures for 2013: 
42 per cent of women and 12 per cent of men between 
16 and 64 years of age).
  The statutory maximum working time in the United 
Kingdom is 48 hours a week. This regulation is part of 
the working time legislation adopted by the then ruling 
Labour Party in 1998.
  A report commissioned by the government  – Lord 
Davies, Minister of State for Trade, Investment and 
Small Business – in 2011 proposed that the 100 biggest 
companies in the United Kingdom should establish a 
voluntary quota of 25  per cent women among senior 
management by 2015. 33 of these companies have 
indeed set a quota. The effect has been ambivalent: while 
the share of non-executive managers increased from 
15.6 per cent in 2010 to 28.5 per cent in March 2015, 
the share of executive managers rose only from 5.5 per 
cent to 8.6 per cent. Overall, at 23.5 per cent the rate just 
falls short of the proposed 25 per cent.
  Women are substantially underrepresented in the 
current government and in Parliament. At the 2015 
parliamentary elections 191 women MPs were elected, 
a share of 29 per cent, which is higher than ever before. 
(In the previous parliament the figure was 23 per cent.) 
In the Labour shadow cabinet, by contrast, half the 
members are women.)
  Maternity leave is 52  weeks, although the right to 
return to the same job applies only for 26 weeks. Paternity 
leave is 14 days. Wage replacement for the first six weeks 
is 90 per cent, falling to 135.45 pounds a week (138.18 
as of 2 February 2015) until the 39th week, or continuing 
at 90 per cent of average weekly earnings, whichever is 
the lower. The remaining 12 weeks are unpaid. Payments 
are borne by the employer, who can reclaim 92 per cent 
from the state. Maternity and paternity leave can be 
claimed only by people in work.
  Paternity leave was introduced in 2003 by the previous 
Labour government. In addition, during this period both 
the duration and the financial benefits for maternity 
leave were doubled. In the 2015 election campaign the 
Labour Party announced that, if elected, it wanted to 
double paternity leave to four weeks.
  Since 2011 there has been an option for mothers to 
assign up to 26  weeks of their maternity leave to the 
father, although only if the child is at least 20 weeks old 
(Additional Paternity Leave).
  For children born or adopted after 5 April 2015 there 
is a possibility for the parents to divide the remaining 
optional weeks and income replacement payments if the 
mother ends her maternity leave early (Shared Parental 
Leave and Pay). However, this must happen within the 
child’s first year.
  All employees (originally only parents and carers) 
have the right, after a minimum of 26  weeks in a 
post, to request flexible working time (flexitime, part-
time, telework, job-sharing). Employers are obliged to 
examine such requests, although they are not obliged 
to grant them. In practice, however, child care or care of 
dependents continues to be considered a »good reason«.
  For every child above 3 years of age parents can claim 
15 hours of state-funded child care per week. Parental 
leave lasts a maximum of 1 year from the birth of the 
child. This means that there is a gap with regard to 2 year-
olds. The Conservative Party’s election manifesto for the 
2015 parliamentary elections promised to increase free 
care for 3- and 4-year-olds to 30 hours a week, but this 
has not yet been implemented.
  For children under 3 years of age child care provision is 
poor: only 35 per cent of under threes receive child care 
outside the family. There is little public debate on this 
problem, however.
  Schools in the United Kingdom are, in principle, free 
to decide how long they offer care outside school hours. 
No political party has come up with reform ideas on this.
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  Hospitals are state funded, but care services have to 
be financed privately by patients.
  Income replacement payments for family members 
who care for dependents are available only for low 
earners (maximum of around 61.35 pounds a week). 
People on low incomes of up to 102 pounds a week 
who care for other people (not only family dependents) 
for at least 35  hours a week can apply for a »Carer’s 
Allowance« of 62.10 pounds a week. They can also 
apply for a »Carer’s Credit« that replaces missed pension 
contributions. This applies to people providing at least 
20 hours of care per week
  Under the current government a ceiling for private 
costs of care was introduced: the state subsidises costs of 
care above 72,000 pounds (as of February 2015).
  44  per cent of older people in need of care are in 
professional care.
  Women’s pensions are, on average, one-third lower 
than those of men. The risk of poverty of women and 
men over 65 years of age is 21.4 per cent, above the EU 
average of 15.9 per cent (figures for 2010). Women are 
harder hit by this than men.
  In England and Wales same-sex marriage was adopted 
in mid-2013, in Scotland in early 2014. Northern Ireland 
explicitly opposes same-sex marriage. Before that there 
was the option of civil partnerships, which were broadly 
equal to marriage, including adoption rights (with the 
exception of Northern Ireland up to 2013). Neighbouring 
Ireland voted for same-sex marriage in a referendum in 
May 2015.
8.2  Current Developments and Debates
Within the United Kingdom there are sometimes major 
differences between England, Scotland, Wales, and in 
particular Northern Ireland. One example is abortion 
legislation. In contrast to the other countries of the 
United Kingdom abortion is illegal in Northern Ireland. 
The sole exception is if the pregnancy endangers the 
life of the mother; rape and foetal deformations are 
not grounds for abortion. According to a law of 1861 
women who have an illegal abortion are to be punished 
with life imprisonment.
The Labour Party was in power in the United Kingdom from 
1997 to 2010. During this period there was substantial 
progress in family policy  – especially the introduction 
of so-called »Sure Start Centres« (see below)  – which 
the subsequent conservative-liberal government put 
into reverse, generally speaking. It remains to be seen 
that the Conservatives’ election victory in 2015 will 
mean for family and gender policy. There was little in 
the Conservative election manifesto about family policy 
(see the promised expansion of care above) and nothing 
explicit about gender policy. The coming referendum 
on whether to remain in the EU could have far-reaching 
consequences in this regard. EU exit would probably 
mean that the United Kingdom would fall behind with 
regard to family and gender policy, because in this 
country the EU has hitherto been the main driving force 
in this respect.
Even 15 to 20 years ago the family and the division of 
labour between women and men was still considered 
a private matter, which had no place in public debate. 
That has changed considerably in the meantime. Family 
policy has become a public issue and a frequent topic 
of public debate. Child care dominates the debate; that 
also applies to the family and gender equality policy 
disagreements between the parties. However, whether 
child care is a national task is no longer an issue, but 
rather how it is to be organised.
In 1998 the Labour government, under the aegis of 
Gordon Brown, launched the »Sure Start« programme. 
It was a major social and equal opportunity policy 
achievement. Within the framework of this programme – 
with the help of considerable state investment – a large 
number of local initiatives were launched to expand early 
child care, with the primary focus on disadvantaged 
groups. By 2001 there were already around 250 local 
»Sure Start« projects. From 2005 the very heterogeneous 
local projects were integrated in »Sure Start Children’s 
Centres«. In these integrated centres, found in particular 
in socially deprived areas, a mixture of child care, early 
childhood education, health care services and family 
support are provided. In 2010 there were already over 
3,000 such centres, which meant that high quality 
provision was available in almost every part of the United 
Kingdom.
In recent years, however, under the Conservative 
government, the funding of »Sure Start« Centres has 
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been cut by 20  per cent. Many Centres have already 
had to close or to reduce their services and others will 
have to follow suit. Because not all municipalities are in a 
position to make up for the diminished state support, it is 
likely that Centres will close primarily in poorer areas – in 
other words, precisely where they are most needed  – 
and where families cannot make up for the lost state 
provision with private child care. At present there is a 
heated debate on the future of the »Sure Start« Centres 
in the United Kingdom.
An OECD comparison (2012) shows that the United 
Kingdom now has the second highest child care costs, 
at 27 per cent of family income, after Switzerland (way 
ahead on 51 per cent). The OECD average is 11.8 per 
cent. The Family and Childcare Trust has calculated that 
the costs of part-time care for small children (up to 
2 years of age) rose by one-third under the Conservative-
Liberal Coalition, while at the same time only 43  per 
cent of UK municipalities fulfil their obligation to provide 
care for the children of working parents (figure for 2014: 
54 per cent). For many families it is more economical for 
one parent – usually the mother – to stay at home and 
look after the children.
At the same time, with the collapse in industrial jobs 
and later due to the economic crisis the number of 
women who are the main or sole breadwinner in their 
family has risen sharply. In combination with the high 
child care costs that often means that these families 
live in very difficult financial circumstances. One million 
women in the United Kingdom are now the sole or main 
breadwinner in their family. No policy solutions have so 
far been forthcoming to address this structural change.
Particularly hard hit in this respect is the so-called 
»sandwich generation«, namely, the women who have 
to care for both their children and ailing parents, while 
also perhaps having to provide the family income. There 
is very little support for such women. People in need 
of care with few financial resources are in an extremely 
vulnerable position in the United Kingdom. Because care 
services have to be funded privately by patients people in 
need of care with limited funds are often not discharged 
from (state-funded) hospitals. A fundamental reform 
of health care and social provision (see below) is thus 
under discussion. Little discussed, if at all, is the issue of 
reconciling care and job, not even by the Labour Party.
Particularly problematic with regard to equal opportunity 
policy in the United Kingdom is the combination of 
high weekly working hours and the few hours a week 
for which (free) child care is available. However, the 
issue of »flexible working time« – as an entitlement of 
employees  – or the reduction of working time is not 
really a topic of public discussion or at most by left-
wing think tanks. Instead, the working time debate is 
focused on zero-hours contracts (work contracts that 
do not stipulate working hours). The employer pays only 
if the employee actually works; on the other hand, the 
employee must be available at all times in case they are 
needed for work. The reconciliation of family and job are 
particularly difficult in this instance. In the last quarter 
of 2014 just under 700,000 workers were employed 
on such zero-hours contracts as their main source of 
employment.
So-called »austerity policy« affects women in the United 
Kingdom disproportionately. The conservative-liberal 
government, besides cutting spending on the »Sure 
Start« programme, has also cut income replacement 
payments in maternity leave. Rises in maternity leave 
are limited to 1 per cent a year, which is not enough to 
cover cost-of-living rises. The funding of many NGOs, 
especially those involved in projects tackling violence 
against women, has also been cut back sharply during 
the crisis.
In the past, efforts were made to take a broader 
approach to equal opportunities and to standardise anti-
discrimination laws. In 2010, in the Equality Act 2010, 
the »Gender Equality Duty« (GED) was replaced with 
the »Public Sector Equality Duty«, which covers various 
forms of discrimination. (The GED obliged all public 
institutions to actively promote equal opportunities for 
women and men and to adopt measures against sexual 
discrimination and harassment.) The new law has been 
criticised because it has no explicit gender component 
and takes no account of forms of multiple discrimination. 
The Equality Act does not apply to Northern Ireland.
Similarly, the Women’s National Commission was 
replaced in October 2007 by the Government Equalities 
Office (GEO). This works with all ministries, although it is 
presided over by the Minister for Women and Equalities, 
since April 2014 Nicky Morgan of the Conservative Party 
(In 2013 Morgan voted against same-sex marriage, but 
later acknowledged that she would vote differently today 
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because at the time she had wrongly assumed that her 
constituents were opposed to the Act.). The focus of 
the Equalities Office over the past year were the gender 
pay gap and women in executive positions (priorities), 
homophobia in schools and »positive body image«.
In September 2011 the government launched the 
»Think, Act, Report« initiative, a cooperation project with 
industry to draw attention to fairer pay for women. At 
present, around 1 million employees are registered in the 
»Think, Act, Report« initiative. However, participation in 
the initiative does not require actual disclosure of wages, 
but merely basic data on the number of employees and 
whether a company has, in general, addressed the issue 
of fair pay. »Think, Act, Report« is one of the main 
projects of the national Equalities Office.
The poor representation of women in Parliament is 
often criticised and in different quarters. In particular 
in summer 2014, when an international ranking of the 
representation of women in parliament was published, 
which showed that the United Kingdom had fallen 
from twentieth place in 1997 to sixty-fifth in 2014, the 
option of all-women shortlists (AWS) was discussed 
with renewed vigour. The Labour Party had already 
introduced the possibility of establishing all-women’s lists 
for parliamentary elections some time previously. Deputy 
party leader Harriet Harman justified this step as being 
the only one that would work: even in the case of 50/50 
candidate lists the men were always selected. In summer 
2014 Prime Minister David Cameron and some other 
Conservatives also acknowledged that they wanted to 
consider the possibility of all-women’s lists. The idea was 
to make the party look more modern and to give it more 
resonance among women voters. Former Conservative 
Minister for Women Maria Miller also advocates women’s 
lists, although only if the proportion of women does not 
improve of its own accord soon. The official position of 
the Conservative Party is that there are no plans for all-
women’s lists. Critical voices regard the Tories’ hints as a 
last-minute effort to get more votes. However, a majority 
of Conservative voters – including women – are against 
AWS.
The Conservatives have threatened that they will quit 
the European Convention on Human Rights unless 
British courts obtain more competences. Presumably 
that will also have consequences for the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). The United Kingdom has already been 
reprimanded by the CEDAW Committee because of the 
austerity measures that have affected many women and 
the abolition of the Gender Equality Duty. At the time of 
the last CEDAW Report in 2010 the Government Equality 
Office (GEO) refused to cooperate with women’s NGOs.
8.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
Election Manifesto 2015
General
  In its manifesto Labour concentrated on improving the 
party’s economic policy appeal, focusing on reducing the 
budget deficit. Other key issues were the NHS and the 
conditions on the labour market. The idea was to appeal 
to so-called »working families«.
  It was announced in the manifesto that large 
companies would be obliged to publish figures on their 
gender pay gap. New Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn 
also addressed this issue in the paper Working with 
Women in July  2015. Although the United Kingdom 
passed an Equal Pay Act as early as 1970 wage equality 
between men and women has still not been attained.
  The shadow minister for women and equality has 
been Gloria de Piero since 2013.
Child care
  Working parents of 3- and 4  year-old children 
(compulsory schooling begins at 5 years of age) are to 
be entitled to 25 hours a week (instead of the current 
15 hours) of free child care. To meet the additional care 
costs Labour proposes to impose a bank levy (a tax on the 
high-risk loans of British banks). In addition Labour wants 
to expand the »Sure Start« programme once again.
  »Sure Start« is to be fundamentally revised so that 
the different local arrangements can function together 
better.
  Labour is also discussing the quality of child 
care. Parents are to be consulted on how child care 
arrangements are working.
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  Furthermore, child care before and after school (8 
am–6 pm) is to be introduced for primary-school children.
  The Labour Party recognises that many fathers would 
like to spend more time with their children and proposes 
to double paternity leave from two to four weeks, as well 
as to raise paternity benefit to 260 pounds.
Living Wage
  Labour advocates a »living wage«, that is, a wage 
higher than the current minimum wage (since 1998) 
and that covers all living costs. This demand is made 
in particular within the framework of family-policy 
positions.
  The Labour Party also proposed to increase the 
national minimum wage from the present £6.50 (since 
October 2014) to over £8 by 2019.
  Labour wants to abolish the much-criticised zero-
hours contracts (see above), under which men and 
women are employed without a fixed number of hours 
and at best find out only at short notice whether they will 
be required to work or not.
Improving the Quality of Teacher Training
  Labour criticises the current extremely variable quality 
of teacher training and schools. In particular, in poorer 
areas there is a distinct lack of good schools at present.
  Labour wants to improve teachers’ qualifications and to 
provide all schools with the same good general conditions 
and freedom to be able to improve. Furthermore, control 
of schools is to be decentralised and regional supervisory 
bodies introduced. Parents are also to be enabled to get 
involved via these supervisory bodies.
  Non-academic training is to be improved through the 
introduction of a »technical baccalaureate«.
Reform of the Health Care System
  The National Health Service was one of the main 
campaign issues of both parties. The Conservatives 
promised investment in the amount of 8 billion pounds 
a year during the next government. Labour announced 
that it would invest 2.5  billion pounds more than the 
Conservatives in order to pay for 8,000 new general 
practitioners, 20,000 nurses and 3,000 midwives. There 
would also be a guarantee that all patients would be able 
to see a GP within 48 hours.
  Labour aims to reform the health care system in such 
a way as to integrate services for physical health, mental 
health and social services. Privatisation of the health care 
system is to be stopped in its tracks.
As a result, Labour justifies its plans to invest money in 
more free child care primarily in terms of the economic 
argument of increasing women’s employment. To this 
end Labour has emphasised the long-term costs incurred 
by closing the Sure Start Centres. This has been backed 
up by, among others, the Fabian Society and the largest 
left-wing think tank in the United Kingdom, the Institute 
for Public Policy Research (IPPR), both of which stress 
that high child care costs are economically counter-
productive because they keep well qualified women 
out of the labour market. Furthermore, the higher 
spending on 25 hours of free child care a week would be 
compensated by higher tax revenues (the IPPR has made 
the relevant calculations). Another left-wing argument 
for more free child care is the improvement of equal 
opportunities for children through school enrolment. It 
is important to note, however, that, as a Fabian Society 
survey confirmed, there is a consensus across the political 
spectrum on the view that tax increases should rather be 
spent on funding care for older people than for children.
After the election defeat the Labour Party finds itself 
in contest to determine its future direction. The lack of 
»economic competence« which a considerable portion 
of the electorate has been persuaded to believe in has led 
a number of leading figures to talk in a business-friendly 
way; others argue that the party should focus once more 
on its social democratic values and social policy strengths. 
Jeremy Corbyn, elected party leader in September 2015, 
published a paper Working with Women a few months 
before his election, which contained an array of equality 
policy goals. Among other things he expressed a desire 
for free child care, an expansion of resources for care, 
in particular at local level, and to introduce a women’s 
quota for Labour MPs of 50 per cent.
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Labour Women
  Labour Women’s positions on family- and gender 
policy are scarcely more copious or detailed than those 
of the main party.
  Women in politics: Labour Women emphasises that 
the Labour Party has the best representation of women, 
although they advocate an even higher proportion. In 
fact, with 42.7 per cent of its MPs women, the Labour 
Party has the best gender balance.
  In early 2014 deputy party chair Harriet Harman 
launched a new website for Labour Women, »Amplify. 
The Voice of Labour Women«. The goals of the project 
include raising awareness of the damage inflicted on 
women by David Cameron’s government, defending 
what the previous Labour government did for women 
and offering a forum for the exchange of campaign ideas 
for the 2015 general election.
  It is an overarching aim of the Labour Party to make it 
easier for mothers to return to employment (see above). 
Labour Women would like to ensure, however, that 
women are not forced to return to work prematurely and 
point out that to that end the duration of maternity leave 
was doubled under the previous Labour government.
Other Actors
  In the United Kingdom there is a very active and 
well networked NGO scene dealing with gender, equal 
opportunities and family policy. At the level of individual 
countries the various groups are organised in the umbrella 
bodies »Engender« in Scotland, the National Alliance 
of Women’s Organisations (NAWO) in England, the 
Northern Ireland Women’s European Platform (NIWEP) 
and the Women’s Equality Network Wales (WENWales). 
At national level representatives of these four umbrella 
organisations make up the UK Joint Committee on 
Women (UKJCW).
  Commission on Older Women: A »Commission on 
Older Women« has been established via the website 
yourbritain.org.uk, which addresses the concerns of 
older women in relation to work, the media and care 
responsibilities. The initial motivation was the observation 
that older women are often neglected in society. 
Furthermore, 50 and 60 year-old women – the first to 
have both families and careers – still suffer considerable 
disadvantages.
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9.  uSA
9.1  Facts and Figures
  The gender pay gap stands at 23 per cent.
  Women make up almost half of the workforce, at just 
under 47 per cent.
  Of mothers with children under 1 year of age 55.8 per 
cent are in employment.
  Part-time employment among women is very low: 
only 17.5 per cent of women work part-time, compared 
with 10 per cent of men.
  The proportion of women on the boards of the top 
500 companies (by turnover) in the United States is just 
under 14.6 per cent.
  There is neither parental allowance nor parental leave. 
Employers with 50 employees or more are obliged under 
federal law (Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993) to 
grant 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave (for men as well 
as women), care leave and unpaid sick days.
  Child care options are inadequate and often very 
expensive. A study by the Children’s Defense Fund 
found that child care costs parents more than a college 
education. However, 43  per cent of under-threes and 
66 per cent of 3–5 year-olds receive external care.
9.2  Current Developments and Debates
In contrast to Europe the yardstick for gender and 
equality policy in the United States is not family policy or 
the reconciliation of family and work (at the federal level 
there is no department of state for women or the family), 
but primarily discrimination and abortion legislation.
While in Europe equal opportunities are implemented 
primarily by means of political measures, in the United 
States private actors are predominant. Feminism and 
feminist organisations have much more influence in US 
society than in, for example, Germany. Women’s rights 
organisations  – such as the National Organization for 
Women (NOW), NARAL Pro Choice or Emily’s List  – 
are extremely influential and can rely on a broad and 
membership base which can easily be mobilised.
Women’s policy issues are often extremely divisive 
in the United States. Women’s rights organisations 
are confronted by an increasingly reactionary 
(»conservative«), often Christian-influenced lobby 
that wants to ban abortion, rejects sex education and 
demands that women in particular get married as virgins.
Few issues are as controversial in the United States 
as reproductive rights, which are under siege at the 
moment. Abortion is a bitterly contentious and restricted 
fundamental right. Progressive opinion in particular views 
abortion policy as an integral part of women’s and equal 
opportunity policy. In 1973 the Supreme Court, in the 
famous Roe vs Wade case, de facto declared all state 
abortion legislation to be unconstitutional by declaring 
the right to privacy extended to a woman’s right to 
have an abortion. While those on the left welcomed the 
decision, there was an outcry among large sections of the 
population. This is due both to the fact that the judges 
were well ahead of public opinion in their construction 
of abortion as a basic right and also that their ruling even 
permitted late abortions. In the ensuing years the basic 
right to an abortion, despite vigorous protests from the 
pro choice movement, became subject to considerable 
restrictions under national and state legislation and 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In particular since 
»conservatives« came to power in several states in 2010 
the law has been tightened up: from 2011 to 2013 more 
restrictive laws on abortion were passed than during the 
previous decade. In some states – mainly in the south and 
mid-west – abortion clinics were legally prohibited and 
closed under pressure from »conservative« politicians. 
This led to a situation in which women in some areas had 
to travel up to 400 km in order to terminate a pregnancy, 
despite the fact that women are still perfectly entitled to 
a termination in the United States.
The so-called »pro life« movement is extremely 
accomplished in mobilisation and its supporters are very 
active in election campaigns. To them, the end justifies 
any means. President Obama puts himself in the pro 
choice camp and spoke out against the so-called Hyde 
amendment and the so-called »global gag rule« as a 
presidential candidate. The Hyde amendment is a law 
passed in 1976 that prohibits the use of tax revenues for 
abortions other than in cases of rape or incest or if the life 
of the mother is at risk. The »global gag rule« says that 
development aid cannot be granted to institutions that 
even mention the option of terminating a pregnancy at a 
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counselling session. The »global gag rule« was reinstated 
during the presidency of George W. Bush (having 
been signed by Ronald Reagan as early as 1984 and 
overturned by Bill Clinton in 1993). President Obama’s 
order to overturn the ban was one of the first actions of 
his presidency. Amending or even abolishing the Hyde 
amendment, which is almost 40 years-old, is a much more 
difficult prospect for President Obama and at present it 
is not a priority. On the contrary, before the legislative 
work on health care reform commenced, President 
Obama, to the extreme annoyance of his progressive 
base, announced that health care reform would not lead 
to any change in current abortion law. The point was 
that the already precarious health care reform was not 
to be jeopardised even further by introducing the issue 
of abortion. At the urging of conservative Democrats, 
however, abortion legislation was eventually amended 
in the course of health care reform. Although President 
Obama is against the Hyde amendment he declared 
himself willing to reaffirm it to placate the conservative 
wing of his party. Thus the health care reform contains 
the so-called »Nelson amendment«, which stipulates 
that health insurers that receive public funds may not 
include abortions in their insurance policies, but have to 
provide separate insurance policies for abortions, which 
are not paid for with tax money. The expense associated 
with a separate insurance policy make it unlikely that 
health insurers will bear the costs of abortions at all.
Extremely disturbing in this situation is the growing 
influence of radical Christians, who among other things 
are also opposed to contraception. The so-called »Hobby 
Lobby« case has become particularly well known. This 
concerns a company whose owners are ultra conservative 
Christians. They claim that their religious beliefs prohibit 
them from allowing their employees access to means of 
contraception. This ended up before the Supreme Court, 
which found in favour of the company owners.
The proportion of women on the boards of the top 
500 US companies (by turnover) is only around 14.6 per 
cent. However, that is six times higher than in Germany 
(2.4 per cent). The difference is due to two reasons in 
particular: anti-discrimination legislation and the notion 
of diversity management. The diversity approach is 
based on the premise that companies benefit from a 
heterogeneous workforce. This is why companies value 
and take an interest in gender, ethnicity, religion and 
other characteristics.
The most far-reaching national regulations influencing 
women’s equality in the United States are the anti-
discrimination laws. Some of these laws have existed in 
the United States – in contrast to Germany – for almost 
50 years and prohibit, among other things, discrimination 
on the ground of gender. Particularly important in relation 
to gender discrimination are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The first forbids 
discrimination in recruitment, dismissal, promotion and 
demotion procedures, as well as practices that appear 
neutral, but which have a disproportionate affect on 
groups protected by the law. In the case of deliberate 
violation of anti-discrimination laws companies in the 
United States face fines running into millions of dollars 
(punitive damages). For this reason and because of the 
potential harm to the firm’s reputation anti-discrimination 
legislation in the United States is taken very seriously.
The Equal Pay Act provides that there must be equal pay 
for equal work, with the focus on the tasks that actually 
have to be completed during the working day and the 
qualifications needed for that purpose. In the case of 
a successful law suit employees can receive damages, 
although the burden of proof in litigation lies with the 
employee.
Despite the Equal Pay Act, the anti-discrimination 
legislation and the importance of diversity, women in 
full-time employment in the United States receive, on 
average, only 77 per cent of the average pay of men. 
That is due, on one hand, to the fact that sectors in which 
a disproportionate number of employees are women 
are characterised by worse pay than male-dominated 
sectors. Another substantial reason for the »pay gap« is 
the treatment of mothers in full-time employment. While 
childless women earn 94 per cent of what childless men 
earn, mothers earn only 60 per cent of what fathers earn. 
Furthermore, non-white women are even harder hit by 
the gender pay gap: an Afro-American woman earns 
around 65 per cent of what a man earns.
In the 2008 election campaign Barack Obama promised 
that the anti-discrimination legislation that had been 
blocked under President Bush  – the so-called Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act – would come into force. The Fair 
Pay Act was also the first law signed by President Obama. 
It makes possible legal action for wage discrimination 
against the employer even if the discrimination has already 
been going on for longer than three months. Before the 
60
ON THE wAY TO GENDER EquALITY?  |  uSA
law came into force there was a three-month period for 
bringing an action; the point is that employees often only 
discover that they are suffering wage discrimination after 
the deadline has expired. Overall, only 15 per cent of all 
discrimination suits brought before the courts are won 
by the plaintiff. (The average for successful civil suits is 
51 per cent.) Judges demonstrably allow discrimination 
cases less often than other civil law cases or, when it 
comes to negotiations, allow them less time in court. The 
Fair Pay Act was celebrated by Obama’s supporters as an 
important victory.
Women’s rights organisations have also long been cam-
paigning for the establishment of a so-called Pay Check 
Fairness Act. This would oblige employers to publish em-
ployees’ pay levels, which would make it much easier for 
women to defend themselves against unequal pay (or 
at least to find out about it in the first place). President 
Obama has already signed such an order for state-owned 
companies; they now have to provide information on 
their pay practices by race and gender. This does not 
apply to private companies, however; a law to that effect 
was rejected by Congress in September 2014.
Other important family policy issues, in particular 
discrimination against mothers in the labour market, 
have not made it onto President Obama’s agenda, 
however. They include the precarious situation of women 
during maternity. The United States is today the only 
industrialised country without any guaranteed paid 
maternity leave. Although employers are obliged by 
federal law (Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993) to 
grant 12 weeks’ unpaid parental leave (for men as well 
as women), care leave and unpaid sick days, that applies 
only to companies with 50 employees or more. Only 
rarely have states introduced more generous regulations 
with longer leave duration and sometimes income 
replacement payments (for example, California, also for 
family members in need of care).
In the United States 13 per cent of all men and 16 per 
cent of all women are affected by poverty. The latter 
figure includes a disproportionate number of single 
mothers, women with an immigrant background and 
African Americans. Because of the economic and financial 
crisis the percentage of poor people in the United States 
has grown even further. Millions of economically active 
people have become unemployed since the outbreak 
of the financial and economic crisis in autumn 2008. 
The general tenor of media reporting presents the crisis 
as a »masculine problem«. At first glance, this makes 
sense: 80 per cent of those who lost their jobs during the 
crisis were men. This is explained, on one hand, by the 
fact that in the first place it was full-time jobs occupied 
mainly by men that were cut and on the other hand 
that »male sectors«, such as industry and construction, 
are more susceptible to economic upheaval than the 
»female sectors«, such as health care and education. 
During the financial and economic crisis for a time there 
were fractionally more women in employment than men.
President Obama’s efforts to combat the financial and 
economic crisis within the framework of the US economic 
stimulus package have predominantly been devoted to 
investment in »male sectors«. However, regardless of 
the crisis and the stimulus package, and due rather to 
demographic change, the number of jobs in the care 
sector has grown sharply, leading to a slight recovery 
of the labour market. The economic crisis in the United 
States has also had an unexpected effect on highly 
qualified women. It is primarily the jobs of low qualified 
workers that have been cut due to the crisis. Well 
qualified women, however, long active as housewives, 
have increasingly returned to the labour market, for 
a whole range of reasons: loss of their partner’s job, 
loss of assets due to the financial crisis or worries about 
economic decline.
Women make up only 18.5 per cent of the representatives 
in the two houses of the US Congress. After the mid-
term elections in November 2014 this number increased 
marginally. This leaves the United States lagging behind 
even Afghanistan and Pakistan in this respect. The cause 
is the US electoral system. While in Germany many seats 
in the Bundestag are allocated via lists, in the United 
States voters decide in primaries whom will stand as 
candidates in the election – all representatives are direct 
candidates. For that reason the political parties have only 
limited influence on who will stand for them and have no 
opportunity to make a commitment to a certain number 
of seats for women or to impose quotas in candidate 
selection. A candidate’s prospects of winning a primary 
and getting elected depend largely on their financial 
backing. For that reason the organisation Emily’s List was 
founded in 1985 to support, at local, regional and national 
level, the election campaigns of female candidates for 
the Democratic Party who advocate reproductive rights. 
Since 1985 Emily’s List has raised over 80 million dollars 
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for election campaigns and thus has participated in the 
election of many female politicians, for example, former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Democrat minority leader 
Nancy Pelosi and former Secretary of Health, Kathleen 
Sebelius. The Republicans recently established a similar 
organisation, named GOPink, in order to provide backing 
for Republican women in election campaigns. Sexism 
remains a serious problem in US election campaigns, 
against which equal opportunity mechanisms have little 
purchase. Media interest in politicians is great, although 
it can easily turn into a »witch hunt«. Media campaigns 
against female politicians such as Hillary Clinton, Nancy 
Pelosi or even Sarah Palin scarcely have an equivalent 
among male politicians.
Even before Barack Obama came to office in January 
2009 women’s organisations  – among others, Emily’s 
List  – were criticising the future president. Women 
made up much less than 50  per cent of the cabinet 
he was proposing. Even the final cabinet contained less 
than one-third women. On the other hand, besides 
the Department of the Interior and the Department of 
Health, what previously had been male domains – such 
as the Department of Trade  – were now occupied by 
women. Furthermore, with his two nominations for the 
Supreme Court President Obama sent an important signal 
concerning equal opportunities for women. First, he 
nominated Sonia Sotamayor, who became only the third 
woman and the first Latina to be appointed Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court. His second nomination 
was Elena Kagan, whose appointment meant, among 
other things, that for the first time ever the Supreme 
Court had three women on its benches, comprising one-
third of its members.
Women were decisive in Barack Obama’s election 
victory in 2008: 54  per cent of women voters voted 
Democrat. Barack Obama addressed women voters 
directly in his election campaign by putting issues such 
as anti-discrimination, but also abortion policy on his 
agenda. After four years in office President Obama again 
targeted women’s votes. His achievements with regard 
to policy on women are somewhat mixed, however, as 
the results of the mid-term elections showed: women 
voters once again voted Democrat and Republican in 
equal proportions. Nevertheless, in 2012 women’s votes 
again proved decisive: 55 per cent of women voted for 
Obama, as against 44 per cent for Mitt Romney, while 
52 per cent of men voted for Romney. Only in 1996 had 
the voting gender gap been wider. The troops were at 
the ready: »A Romney presidency would send women 
back to the 1950s«, wrote Jessica Valenti in a scathing 
commentary in The Guardian written shortly before the 
election. US author and founder of the feminist blog 
Feministing-org, Valenti was only one of many feminists, 
women journalists and women artists who backed 
Obama’s re-election.
Broadly speaking, women as an electoral constituency 
incline more to the Democratic Party, especially single 
women; married women rather vote Republican. This 
is generally explained by the belief that women voters 
apportion higher priority to »social« issues, such as 
education and health care, which Democrats tend to 
favour, than men do. At the mid-term elections, by 
contrast, the key issues were tackling unemployment 
and public debt. The Democrats, whom the bulk of the 
population have been persuaded to believe are incapable 
of getting the US economy going again and of reducing 
public debt, suffered a historic defeat. Turnout was 
particularly low among working and single mothers, who 
tend to favour the Democrats very strongly.
9.3  Positions and Discussions in the 
Centre-Left Spectrum
Gender policy–relevant issues adopted or under 
discussion by the Democrats include the following:
  Improved access to the health care system for women 
and better coverage of services by health insurance 
companies (criticism of differing premiums for women 
and men, ban on refusal of insurance due to previous 
breast cancer, funding of »planned parenthood«, co-
insurance of children up to 26 years of age).
  Education: reform of the grants system, expansion of 
the kindergarten system, projects to improve the quality 
of schools.
  Establishment of the »White House Council on 
Women and Girls« (which reinforces the principle of 
gender mainstreaming).
  Projects to promote the participation of girls and 
women in natural sciences, technical studies and 
mathematics.
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  Violence against Women Act: renewed funding of 
projects to combat violence against women.
  Raising the minimum wage (so it’s sufficient for 
working families to live on).
  Introduction of paid parental leave: in summer 2014 
feasibility studies were funded in five states on the 
introduction of paid parental leave. The Department of 
Labor launched a campaign »Lead on Leave«.
  Raising tax deductions for »working families« (on 
many issues the focus is on »work« and »working 
families«: hard work is supposed to pay).
  Expansion of credit for small businesses, which are 
three to five times more frequently managed by women 
or minorities.
The progressive think tank the Center for American 
Progress recommends seven measures to reduce the 
gender pay gap:
(i) Because women are disproportionately represented 
in the low wage sector (two-thirds of all minimum 
wage workers are women), they would benefit more 
from a raising of the minimum wage, from $7.25 to a 
recommended $10.10.
(ii) An increase in the minimum wage is also 
recommended for employees receiving so-called »tipped 
wages«  – tips amount to around $2.13 per hour  – 
because women predominate here, too.
(iii) Support for fair working time planning because 
flexible working time is often required by employers in 
the low wage sector, but for (single) mothers in particular 
this poses a problem.
(iv) Support for transparency with regard to wage issues.
(v) Investment in affordable and high quality care 
provision.
(vi) Around 40  per cent of US women workers have 
no access to paid sick leave; for part-time workers this 
rises to 73 per cent. In cities and some states there are 
already initiatives to improve access to paid sick leave, 
but federal regulation would also have a positive effect 
on the gender pay gap.
(vii) As much as 10 per cent of the gender pay gap is 
attributable to the fact that women can devote less time 
to their professional career (especially because of care 
work). A mere 12 per cent of US women workers have 
access to paid family leave from their employer and the 
United States is the only developed nation that does 
not offer state support services and benefits. A national 
social insurance programme to furnish parental leave 
with wage replacement payments and for absence on 
health grounds would improve the economic security 
of families and women’s employment opportunities. In 
some cities such programmes already exist.
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